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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this case pursuant to UCA §78-2-2 and UCA §78-22(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial Court erred in dismissing plaintiffs claim of fraud in the
inducement on the premise, it failed to state a cause of action upon which relief
could be granted.
Determinative law:
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah App.
1988).
Nielsen v. Hefferon, 1999 WL 33244735 (Utah App. 11/04/1999).
OngIntel, v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993).
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1992).
Standard of review:
In reviewing an Order of Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) the court accepts the

material allegations in the Complaint as true and interprets those facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving
party. The appellate court reviews the grant of a Rule 12 (B)(6) motion for correctness,
ceding no deference to the district court.
Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Commission, 175 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2007).
II.

Whether the trial Court erred in dismissing plaintiffs claim of fraud in the
inducement on the premise, it failed to state a cause of action upon which relief
could be granted.
-1-

Determinative law:
Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1988).
Cache County v. Bern, 978 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1999).
Commercial Investment corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1997).
Creer v. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149 (Utah 1978).
Foundation Development Corp. v. Loehman 's Inc., 163 Ariz. 438, 788 P.2d 1189
(1990).
Knighton v. Bowers, WL 797560 (Utah App. 4/15/04).
U-Beva Mines v. Toledo Mining Co., 24 Utah 2d 351, 471 P.2d 867 (1970).
Standard of review:
In reviewing an Order of Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) the court accepts the
material allegations in the Complaint as true and interprets those facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving
party. The appellate court reviews the grant of a Rule 12 (B)(6) motion for correctness,
ceding no deference to the district court.
Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Commission, 175 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2007).
The Appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment for
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. In so doing the
Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.
Shaw Res. Ltd., LLC v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell P.C, 142 P.3d 560 (Utah App.
2006).
III.

Whether the trial Court erred in dismissing plaintiffs claim of fraud in the
inducement on the premise, it failed to state a cause of action upon which relief
-2-

could be granted.
Determinative law:
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991).
Hutcheson v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 1981).
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 78 P.3d 600 (Utah 2003).
OngIntel v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993).
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952).
Smith v. Grand Canyons Expedition Company, 84 P.3d 1154 (Utah 2003 (reh. den.
2004).
Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Standard West Inc., 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988).
Standard of review:
In reviewing an Order of Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) the court accepts the
material allegations in the Complaint as true and interprets those facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving
party. The appellate court reviews the grant of a Rule 12 (B)(6) motion for correctness,
ceding no deference to the district court.
Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Commission, 175 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2007).
IV.

Whether the trial court erred in finding there were no material issues of disputed fact
precluding defendant's summary judgment on their counterclaim.

Determinative law:
Neiderhouser Builder & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1992).
Standard of review:
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine issue
of material fact, the Appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences in a light

-3-

most favorable to the party opposing the motion. It reviews the trial court's conclusions of
law for correctness, including its conclusion that there are no material fact issues.
Neiderhouser Builder & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1992).
V.

Whether the trial court erred in holding that defendants were entitled to summary
judgment on their counterclaim for unlawful detainer and landlord's remedies as a
matter of law.

Determinative law:
UCA §78-36-1
Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1988).
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991).
Cache County v. Beus, 978 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1999).
Commercial Investment corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1997).
Creerv. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149 (Utah 1978).
Foundation Development Corp. v. Loehman 's Inc., 163 Ariz. 438, 788 P.2d 1189
(1990).
Hutcheson v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 1981).
Knighton v. Bowers, WL 797560 (Utah App. 4/15/04).
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah App.
1988).
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 78 P.3d 600 (Utah 2003).
Nielsen v. Hefferon, 1999 WL 33244735 (Utah App. 11/04/1999).
OngIntel, v. 11'" Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d447 (Utah 1993).
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952).
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953).
Smith v. Grand v. Grand Canyons Expedition Company, 84 P.3d 1154 (Utah 2003)
(reh. den. 2004).
Spears v. Warr, 44P.3d 742 (Utah 2002).
U-Beva Mines v. Toledo Mining Co., 24 Utah 2d 351, 471 P.2d 867 (1970).
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1992).
Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Standard West Inc., 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988).
Standard of review:
The appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of a summary judgment for
-4-

correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. In so doing, the
court views the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.
Shaw Res. Ltd, LLC v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell PC, 142 P.3d 560 (Utah App. 2006).
VI.

Whether the trial court erred in calculating the amount of damages purportedly owing
to the defendants.

Determinative law:
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10
Angelos v. First interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1993).
Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206 (Utah 1930).
Smith v. Linmer Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222 (Utah App. 1990).
Veli Convalescent and Care Institutions v. Division of Healthcare Fin., 797 P.2d
438 (Utah App. 1990).
Standard of review:
The appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of a summary judgment for
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. In so doing, the
court views the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.
Shaw Res. Ltdy LLC v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell PC, 142 P.3d 560 (Utah App. 2006).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Copies of all determinative constitution provisions, statutes and rules are attached
hereto as Addendum "B".
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was initiated by the Plaintiff with the filing of a Complaint on September
30, 2004. R. 1. Holmes filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint on October 25, 2004.R.23.
A hearing on the motion took place on April 28, 2005. R. 1549. According to the docket
sheet, on June 29, 200^ Judge Lewis signed an order "re: hrg on 4/28/05, The Court
dismisses the pla's claims for specific performance and promissory estoppel & permitting
pla to amend his unjust enrichment claim or to add a new claim". R.171.
An amended Complaint was filed on August 1, 2005 and Defendants filed a Motion
to Dismiss on August 23, 2005. R.173, R. 197. On August 26, 2005 Defendants left an
Answer and Counterclaim with the Court. R.201. The Defendants however failed to pay the
required filing fee and the Answer and Counterclaim were accordingly not "filed" until
September 27, 2005. Mr. Truong's answer to the Counterclaim was filed the same day.
R.394. On November 7, 2005 Holmes filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Motion for Attachment in aid of lessor's lien. R.501, R.505.
On February 1, 2006 the Court heard oral argument on the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Attachment. R. 1550. At
the conclusion of the hearing the Court indicated Mr. Truong's personal property was
subject to attachment and took the remaining matters under advisement. R.1550 pg 40. On
March 13 Plaintiff posted a cash bond of $150,000.00, with the Court, to effectuate a
release of any claim of a landlord's lien, and filed a motion requesting the Court to
establish the correct amount of the bond. Defendants opposed that motion. R.589. On April
-6-

5, 2006 the Court entered a minute entry wherein it stated it was granting Defendants'
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and for a Writ of Attachment and ordering
Defendants' counsel to prepare an Order reflecting the Court's ruling. R.600.
On May 31, 2006 the property was completely vacated and surrendered to the
Defendants. In July of 2006, Holmes sent a proposed order to Plaintiff. On July 12, 2006
Plaintiff objected to the form of the proposed order. R.670. On August 31, 2006
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgement on Supplemental Damages. R.751.
After the hearing two separate orders, one dealing with an award of damages, the other with
an award of costs and attorney fees, were entered by the court. R.1022, R.1038. The cost
and attorney fees judgment was actually entered one day prior to the judgment itself.
The Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment seeking resolution of the
remaining claims in defendant's counterclaim against plaintiff. R. 1174. At the hearing on
the motion, the defendants informed the court that they no longer desired to pursue those
two claims and the Court accordingly dismissed them, and as there were no longer any
claims present, denied Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as moot R.l 552.
The court's final order was dated March 21, 2008 and entered March 24, 2008.
R.1449. Thereafter this appeal was filed April ] 7, 2008. R.1538.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

In September of 2003, the Plaintiff, Mr. Truong, was approached by a realtor named
Jack Carnell to see if he was interested in acquiring a building located at 1050 South
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Complaint. R.831.
-7-

2

iong was informed that the owners of the property were the Defendants Bruce
and Joan Holmes, H KM.

3.

The building was in a dilapidated condition and w a-, • > 111« -i w IM nn uitjhli" 1. -i
Truong's purposes, but the location was desirable. R.831

4.

i -.

( 11 111 i-111111111 g lo sale the premises or to lease it at the rate of

$3,500.00 per month. R.831.
5.

After a period of negotiations, the parties agreed upon a sale of the property to K lr

6.

After the parties had agreed upon u

-

lines ikivntiiiial that they needed

to defer the timing of the sale in order to obtain more favorable capital gains
i

* issues pertaining to tax liens that were present on the

property. R.832.
7.

Mr. Truong was willing to work with the Holmes to allow them to achie
goals, K M U.

8.

To that end the realtor Mr.

epnv documents

consisting of a lease and option agreement. R.832.
9.

V\ h. ii I i li I M<
i n}4 asked sr -a: «-:, ^ rgthy agreements he was informed that the
agreements were mere formali

*ssary ( • inn I llii* IK % ^ nteria and that the

boiler plate provisions would not be enforced. R.832.
)

""il II I ii

( "!i' .is the intent and understanding of the parties that Mr. Truong was a

"tenant" only as JI lonii.iliU ,UH I

;.u ,^i; me property to him at the
-8-

end of September 2004. R.832.
11.

The parties signed the lease and option agreements at the end of September 2003.
R.832.

12.

At or about the time of execution, Mr. Truong paid the Holmes $90,000.00
consisting of two checks designated as rent of $60,000.00 and a security deposit of
$30,000.00. R.832.

13.

Both of these amounts were to be credited towards the purchase price. R.832.

14.

At this time Mr. Carnell was paid a real estate commission for the sale of the
property. R.832.

15.

During the negotiations for the sale of the property and for periods of time
thereafter, Mr. Truong and Mr. Holmes discussed the renovations Mr. Truong was
going to make to the property. R.832.

16.

The renovations included the complete gutting of one structure, down to the four
walls, and substantial modification to the adjoining office R.832.

17.

Mr. Holmes was aware that Mr. Truong was going to spend hundreds of thousands of
dollars to upgrade the property from a dilapidated structure to an attractive and
viable retail, office and warehouse space. R.832-833.

18.

After the Agreements were in place, Holmes made a demand that Mr. Truong get
insurance in place on the property. R.833.

19.

Mr. Truong had attempted obtain insurance on the property, but had been unable to
procure any due to the dilapidated condition the property was in when it was turned
-9-

over to him. R.833
i I mi in ni i ni ' 11L! > 11 r 111

renovations to the property. R, 8 3 3.

The parties thereafter agreed that the polic> of UKUPHU e the 11« iinn^ \\ i< I n Hio
property would be continued, but that Mr. Truong would pay for that insurance.
R .833
In January of 2004 Holmes sent a lctt.
insurance policy. At that time Mr. Truong was out of the country. R.833.
Ii

u i leav nig the country, Mi I ruong had authorized his brother, Andy Truong to

act on his behalf. Andy I i i i 31 lg, c 11 behalf

-

; .

the insurance along with a letter notifying Holmes of Mr. Truong's intent to
exei ci.se the option to purchase the building. R.833, R. 837.
Holmes admits to recen J e *

.

Thereafter there was little to no communication between the parties until Holmes
scut a letter on or about August 19, 2003, to Mr. Truong, alleging that Truong had
failed to send a Notice of intrnl In rxereise (lie oplmn I II liins vufhin sixty days
of the exercise date, as required under the Option Agreement. R.834.
]\

iiig immediately contacted Holmes and their counsel and informed them 1le

was ready to close on the date enni iinei) n illmi 1I1

niid 11 1 I1 ^ ^4.

Mr. Truong also contacted the attorney who had drafted the lease and option
agreements and had him contact the Holmes counsel and again affirm Mr Truong's
abilit} and inki

• Hie trim^u'iim
.10-

:^

28.

Holmes rejected Mr. Truong's offer to close. R.834.

29.

This rejection led to the initial action in this case which was filed with the Court on
September 30, 2004. R.l.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case consists of three separate and distinct areas of contention, dismissal of the

amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the granting of summary judgments on
defendant's counterclaims, pursuant to Rule 56, and the amount of damages awarded to the
defendants as a result of the granting of the two motions.
In order to defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) the party opposing the
motion need only show that he would be entitled to recover under some version of the
facts. That de minimus threshold is more than adequately met in this case.
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint set forth three causes of action. The Plaintiff plead
facts sufficient to meet all three causes. Defendants sought to avoid this fact by alleging
they have affirmative defenses that will defeat the claims in the complaint. The test under
Rule 12(b)(6) does not however allow a venture into purported affirmative defenses. The
issue is solely whether the "Complaint" states a cause of action on which relief could be
granted. Even if the court were to have looked at the "affirmative defenses" the facts as
plead by the Plaintiff, if accepted as true as required by the rule, still defeat those purported
defenses. The trial court's ruling dismissing the amended complaint was incorrect and has
created a serious injustice.
Summary Judgment is only available where there are no disputed issues of material
-11-

•JL:

I nummary judgment is entitled to judgiik-nl a^ a matter \ f law.

Snyder w Merkley, 693 P 2d. OH- yiyc li >
< ills \\ lira in i Iratiy .ippcns Ih.u ihr pmtv
against whom the judgment would be granted can't possible establish a right to recover
idgment be granted, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of such a
party when summary judgment against

-u,ur-n f undture

Company v. Fidelity and Guarantee Insurance Underwriters, 16 Utah .M "' I 1 W I" M
ill! 11 '(>> i In considering a motion, the court must "view the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn there(rot11 111

• •-

he non-moving party." Carrier v.

Sail Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 (Utah 2004). It only takes one sworn st^cnini! lo
dispute averments on the other side of a controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding
summary judgment, Holhr\>ok i'unwtww i Liiims

ip i m MH IIW I|.

Summary Judgment was given to the Defendants in uii^ n ^

11 i n

acceptance of the Defendants' affirmative defenses to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, n
Plaintiff is i?

e.::r« *

....J o IK in unlawful detainer

thereof. The dismissal of the Amended Complaint is therefore mextrieiil lv ivhleel I', (lie
grant of summary judgment. Reversal of the dismissal accordingly requires the reversal of
the summary jud^in*Mil ;is well
Examining the affirmative defenses discloses that Plaintiff ple^i l • * • •

t

accepted as IIUL vould defeat the affirmative defenses. These facts were set forth in sworn
affidavit

was accordingly obligated to deny the

summary judgment motion, but it failed to do so.
^2-

Examining the argument of the Plaintiff, it likewise becomes clear that neither the
Defendants or the trial court addressed the equitable relief requested by the plaintiff. This
relief consists in part of the "Doctrine of Substantial Compliance" which has been accepted
by Utah Courts and which, by its very nature, creates a jury question not susceptible to
determination through summary judgment.
Finally the plaintiff pointed out that where a party seeks a forfeiture that party must
comply strictly with the provisions which it seeks to enforce. As demonstrated by the
Plaintiff, Defendants failed to comply with the very agreements under which they seek to
cheat the Plaintiff. As a matter of law that result should not be confirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT.

A.

Standard of Review
Motions for judgment on the pleadings are not favored by the courts, and when

made great liberality in construing the assailed pleading should be allowed. Harman v.
Yeager, 100 Utah 30, 110 P.2d 352 (1941). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim challenges a plaintiffs entitlement to relief under the facts alleged or under any state
of facts that could be proved to support the claim. Patterson v. American Fork City, 61
P.3d 466 ( Utah 2003). If there is any doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for
lack of factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of giving the part/ an opportunity
to present its proof. Ho v. Jim's Enterprises, Inc., 29 P.3d 633 (Utah 2001). In ruling on a
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• ^ . » M.iLcto state a claim, a court must construe the claims in the light
most ia\orabic to the plaintiff am

rcnees-.nn^ la\<u, Mounteer

v Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). Whenviewnl in hniil m ihr.r
^l.inilanl.s, il'n i i mi I . dismissal of the complaint is plainly in error.
Z.

I HE AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES SI JITK 'IEi IT FACTS TO SUPPORT
ALL OF ITS CLAIMS FOR RELIEF,
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint sets forth three causes of action, which are plead in

the .ilttTiLinii MI

II

( luiiiiM ,iit I'tii I! . Hit! iii the Inducement, Specific Performance and

Unjust Enrichment. All Plaintiff is seeking is flu; n t n ./mail -i I he at lua I bargain
between the parties as opposed to Defendants attempt to exploit what they obvious
i " "i <»ft h «lt/ fi'iMA in,4 Niein no take outrageous advantage of the Plaintiff. As will be
shown below, the Amended Complaint sels luilh .uinjiuir Lid -, i<> support all three causes
of action.
1.

r

>rth Adequate Facts To Show Fraud in the Inducement

As set forth in the Amended Complaint thr P'.nliu/ „ n/iik i ol iiid«,i Real Instate
Purchase Contract. At Defendant's request, Plaintiff did not close the transa
terms

?

deferred the acquisition of the property for one year. That

deferral, and surrender of the right to immediate < m nrrslui» 'n ,i-, lu.uli n the reasonable
reliance that Plaintiff would receive title to the property the next year. Plaintiff has
sprnfinillv -n en I ii ii In u ,i» lold. prior to executing the lease and purchase option, by
the Defendants, that the lease and purchase «»pi i- >i» " « ", ,i mere tormality and that the boiler

plate provisions of the documents would not be enforced. See Amended Complaint ^29.
In reliance on that promise, Plaintiff spent Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars
renovating the property for his use. After the Defendants received $90,000.00 in cash and
the property itself had been vastly improved, they sought to keep all the money and the
property too. With the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Defendants'
counterclaim they were awarded an even greater cash windfall for their bad faith actions.
Defendants alleged that the claim for fraudulent inducement was not plead with
sufficient specificity. That simply is not true. The allegations in the Amended Complaint
set forth the specific misrepresentations that were made, that they were made by the
Defendants, that they were made prior to execution of the contracts at issue and that the
Plaintiff relied upon those representations both in the manner in which he upgraded the
property and in the manner in which he followed the dictates of the boiler plate in the
agreements. The purpose of the pleading rules is to afford the parties fair notice of the
nature and basis or grounds of the claim being made. Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656
P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). Plaintiffs Amended Complaint far exceeds the basics required.
Defendants next argued that a fraud in the inducement claim is barred because the
agreements they fraudulently induced Plaintiff to sign contain language precluding the
introduction of parol evidence of those misrepresentations. This very issue was addressed
by the Utah Court of Appeals in Nielsen v. Hefferon, 1999 WL 33244735 (Utah App.
11/4/1999). In that case the Court held: "Moreover, parol evidence is admissible to prove
that a party was induced into a contract by fraud, despite a determination that a writing is an
-15-

integrated contract."
^dressing this issue the Court has also held " An integration clause may prevent
enforcement of prior ur rontemp' i( mrous agreeniriih',

I he

•..

*

...

iocs not

prevent proof of fraudulent representations by a party to the contract, or of illegality
accident, or mistake...Paper and ink possess no magic power to cause statements of fact to
be true wt

v

*

>

*;u.-t < <Ui,

\farketing,

Ltd, 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1988).
I he Court of Appeals defined the types of mistake it was referring to:
First, if the instrument does not embody the intentions of both parties to the
contract, a mutual mistake has occurred, and reformation is appropriate. Second, if
one party is laboring under a mistake about a contract term and that mistake either
has been induced by the other party or is known by and conceded to by the other
party, then the inequitable nature of the other party's conduct will have the same
operable effect as a mistake...
Llo) >d's Unlimited at 512.
In determining the effect of the misrepresentations, the <
invalidate only those portions of the agreement that are problematical as a result of the
fraudulri ( iinliii i iiiniiL In IIK iiisLm! i ,i,r thr ( mni need t m ly hold that the nonessential
terms of the contract such as the timing of the notice of intent to exmist,"" ilir opium, ih •
bonding requirements etc, are not enforceable. There would still exist sufficient written
agreement betwtvn iiir |i,utn" v in iiu. |im|K'iiy in IH .HM, the parties to the transaction,
the price and the time the transaction was to close. Consequently i Jofendunt. r\ m i in .
with the statute of frauds are eliminated.
1111s c,isi: I i 111s1111y iJ i s11• ihii• I n.in 11)e cases, cited by Defendants to the trial court,
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because it involves a series of written agreements between the parties. The only necessity
is for the Court to determine what the actual tenns were to be and to do that the Court is
supposed to consider fraud in the inducement and the parol evidence that establishes the
claim.
2.
Plaintiffs Complaint Sets Forth Sufficient Facts For A Claim For Specific
Performance.
"[R]eal property is assumed to be unique for purposes of specific performance and
... specific performance is the presumed remedy for the breach of an agreement to sell real
property." Knighton v. Bowers, WL 797560 (Utah App. Apr. 15, 2004). In its initial
Complaint, Plaintiff sought to rely on the parties intent and Plaintiffs oral affirmation of
his exercise of the option. The Defendant's moved to Dismiss the original complaint
arguing the contracts between the parties were unambiguous and integrated and that they
required notice of intent to exercise the option to be made in writing.
After oral argument on the motion, but prior to the court's ruling, Plaintiff
discovered a writing that gave notice of the intent to exercise the option. That writing,
which was not addressed by the Court in its prior ruling, forms the basis of the claim for
specific performance here.1
Defendants raise several objections to the use of the letter to exercise the option.
The first objection is that the Option could not be exercised because the Plaintiff was in
Default under the terms of the lease. The purported defaults consisted of failing to place

1

A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit UC" to the amended Complaint.R.196.
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insurance on the property, the Plaintiffs alleged making of unauthorized improvements on
(In. piiipL'iKj'l.iiuiill > l.nlwu. 1.1 obtain a performance and completion bond, and
Plaintiffs failure to pay the real property taxes.
Paragraph 10. Of the lease required the Defendant to give written notice of any
alleged default in the lease before it could take any legal action based thereon. Prior to the
letter exercising the option, the only written notice of default was with respect to the
insurance. R.42-43. That alleged defect was cured at the time the letter exercising the
,,

n was sent i ;;c setter contained the demanded payment and the insurance would have

been in place lor ,1 period ol nine past ihe escn ise date."
Paragraph 3 of the Option Agreement provides in pertinent part "Notwithstanding
anything else herein, this option may not be exercised while there exists any uncured
material default undo i lln

I CIM" W huh i, altat Iml liulie, i <plion Agreement as an

Exhibit" (emphasis added). R.55. "Whether a provision in a contract is a condition, the
nonfulfillment of which excuses performance, depends upon the intent of the parties, to be
ascertained from a fan .mil n .• -<
. >n,alili i M.I in,. |i,,ii ul lln language used in light of all llie
circumstances when they executed the contract" Creer v. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149, u i
(Illah I'VS)
The Construction is complete

I'IMT"

'••' n" neid I 'i . i lv in. I hiillu'ininie il

Defendants had closed as they agreed, any need for such a bond would have been

2

It is important to note that the Defendants cashed the check accompanying the letter which
cured the purported default relating to the insurance.
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completely obviated. The bond provision is clearly not ^material" in a fashion that would
have prevented the exercise of the Option. The bond is simply a mechanism to protect the
property owner from mechanic's lien claims and or waste to the property. With the
transfer of ownership to the Plaintiff, all such risk would have passed to him as well.
The Defendants knew exactly what construction Plaintiff was undertaking on the
property. Even after the construction was complete no objection was made as to the scope
or nature of the renovations. It is only when the Defendants look to find a way to reap an
unjust windfall by keeping the property that they first raise this issue as an excuse for their
failure to perform.
With respect to the property taxes, again the taxes would not have become due for
2004 until after transaction would have closed. If the transaction closed, responsibility for
payment of the taxes would have fallen solely on the owner of the property. Therefore
performance of this condition, even if there had been proper notice of default, was not a
"material" breach.
The Defendants' failure to insist on adherence to the precise terms of the contract,
combined with their failure to give any notice of their intention to insist on strict
compliance with the terms of the contract, is ample evidence that they waived strict
compliance with the contractual terms. Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah
App 1988).
The second objection to the exercise of the option is that it constitutes an improper
modification of the agreements, because of its reference to other conversations between
-19-

the parties. This argument is irrelevant for purposes of the specific performance claim.
I' (i, it claim i s i1-; imp I \' 111 i 11 Hi e I c Iter comprises the required notice under paragraph 3 of the
Option.
The third complaint is that he exercise of the option fails under the statute of frauds
because it is unsigned I his argument is specious. The original of the document was signed
and sent to the Defendar

_

is a copy

because the original is in the possession of the Defendants. Hie letter was signed.
1 in (lien i io re the letter does not in and of itself transfer any real property. It simply states
that Plaintiff is willing mid ;ihlr in |nrfnim under the h n is nil Ifie option when and if the
Defendants can perform.
The next complaint is that the Amended Complaint does not contain an allegation
that Andy Truong

^

.

u

omp„tint

speculate as to each and every affirmative defense or counter allegation that will be mad*/
by a Defendant It is sufficient that it provide adequate notice of the claims that are being
made. And\ Irunnv W?K •uithmved Hi

iinm u

i

I 11 1 iruong's behalf. R.833.

During this period of time David Truong was traveling outside the country. Prior to le,ri in*
lie atjilionzeil his brother to act on his behalf. R.833.
The final complaint

^

•:-.....>

aragraph J o(

the Option Agreement simply requires notice of intent to pay the purchase price » ithin Hie
Option Exercise period. I he letter does exactly that. The actual exercise of the option
would have liken pliitv ,il Hie Lilei d.ile, but llie I »elc«idants refused to fulfill their
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obligations to close.
3.
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint Sets Forth The Necessary Facts For A Claim
of Unjust Enrichment.
"A proper claim for unjust enrichment requires that the party show (1) a benefit
conferred on one person by another, (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the
conferee of the benefit, and (3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the
benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain
the benefit without payment of its value."
Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Company, 84 P.3d 1154,1162 (Utah 2003)( reh den.
2004),
In this case Defendants received a benefit from the Plaintiff on three different
levels. The first benefit is in the initial money received from the Plaintiff totaling
$90,000.00. The Second benefit was in the dramatic improvement of the property through
the construction of hundred of thousands of dollars of improvements. The final benefit was
conferred through the trial court's award of rents and unlawful detainer damages.
The Defendants knew of the receipt of the cash and know of the value of the
improvements, which has fueled their attempt to cheat the Plaintiff. Under 1he facts of this
case it would clearly be inequitable for Defendants to receive this windfall without paying
for it.
Defendants argue that because leasehold improvement were governed under the
Lease, there can be no claim for unjust enrichment. This is not true. The clauses cited by
Defendants equate to a liquidated damages clause. When the enforcement of a "forfeiture
provision would allow an unconscionable and exorbitant recovery, bearing no reasonable
relationship to the actual damage suffered, it becomes unenforceable," Hutcheson v.
-21-

Gleave, 632 P.2d 815, 817 (Utah 1981). See Also Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243
P.2d446 (1952): Young Elec. Sign Co. v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d 162, 164
(Utah 1988); Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1096 (Utah 1991).
Furthermore, for a contract to bar damages under quantum meruit it must be an
"enforceable contract" regarding the subject matter. The first key element required in
establishing a contract is a meeting of the minds. Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 78 P.3d 600, 602
(Utah 2003) ("It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an
agreement is essential to the formation of a contract.") Plaintiffs view is that the option
and lease agreement, as drafted, constituted a mere accommodation to the Defendants to
allow them favorable tax benefits by deferring the closing on the property. Defendants now
claim that the option and lease agreement are "integrated" contracts abrogating their
obligation to sell to the Plaintiff under the terms of the REPC. If this was Defendants'
belief at the time of the execution of the documents there was no meeting of the minds and
there was no contract at all. Id.3
The existence of a written document, purporting to be an integrated agreement and
appearing to be valid on its face, does not constitute a valid contract even where drafted by
the party alleging the agreement to be invalid if the party is fraudulently induced into
entering into the agreement. OngInternational (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850

3

In the alternative the Court could reform the contract to meet the parties intentions allowing
Plaintiff to purchase the property. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d
507, 511 (Utah App. 1988).
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P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). Here the Plaintiff was induced to surrender his rights to immediate
title and possession of the property, pursuant to the REPC, in return for a promise that he
would be able to get such possession in the following year. He was led to believe that the
option and lease agreement were merely accommodations for the benefit of the
Defendants. If such is the case he should be allowed to buy the property if such is not the
case then the representations were fraudulent and the option and lease agreement are void.
Because the provisions themselves are unenforceable the Court can and should
consider the considerable unjustified windfall reaped by the Defendants.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

A.

Standard of Review
Summary Judgment is only available where there are no disputed issues of material

fact and the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P 2d. 64 (1984). Only where it clearly appears that the party
against whom the judgment would be granted can't possible establish a right to recover
should summary judgment be granted, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of such a
party when summary judgment against him is being considered. Reliable Furniture
Company v. Fidelity and Guarantee Insurance Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d. 211, 398 P 2d.
685 (1965). In considering a motion, the court must "view the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Carrier v.,
Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 Utah 2004). It only takes one sworn statement to
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dispute averments on the other side of a controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding
summary judgment. Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P 2d. 191 (1975). Where the party
making the motion does not support his or her motion with competent sworn testimony or
other admissible evidence, the party opposing the motion is entitled to rely on his
contradictory pleadings. Parrish v. Lay ton City Corp,, 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975).
B.

Issues of Material Fact Preclude Granting Summary Judgement
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine

issue of material fact, the Appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences in a
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. It reviews the trial court's
conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusion that there are no material fact
issues. Neiderhouser Builder & Dev. Corp, v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App.
1992).
The Defendants' arguments in favor of their original Motion for Summary Judgment
rely on affirmative defenses made in opposition to the Amended Complaint. As will be
demonstrated below there exist issues of material fact precluding a finding in favor of these
defenses.
1.

Statute of Frauds

While the Statue of Frauds requires contracts for the sale of land to be in writing,
exceptions to the Statute exist where there has been part performance. Spears v. Warr, 44
P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002). This argument was examined in detail by the Utah Supreme
Court in Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953). In Ravarino the Court
-24-

stated:
As stated by this court in Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. v. Hershel Gold Min. Co., 103
Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094, 1097, the policy considerations underlying the
doctrines of part performance and estoppel are indistinguishable: " Whether the
legal label given to the basis of the plaintiffs' claimed right to continue in
possession of the property is equitable estoppel, irrevocable license, or an oral
contract for a written extension taken out of the statute of frauds because of partial
performance is not so important. These concepts are but forms designed to serve a
more ultimate principle that no one shall induce another to act on promise of reward
for such act and then after obtaining the benefit of the same repudiate the contract."
The thesis is given further weight by this court in Bamberger Co. v. Certified
Productions, Inc., 88 Utah 194 48 P.2d 489, 492: "As stated by Mr. Justice
Cardozo, then justice of the Court of Appeals of New York, in Imperator Realty Co.
v. Tull, 228 N.Y. 447, 127 N.E. 263,266: "Sometimes the resulting disability has
been characterized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver. cWe need not go into the
question of the accuracy of the description.' The truth is that we are facing a
principle more nearly ultimate than either waiver or estoppel, one with roots in the
yet larger principle that no one shall be permitted to found any claim upon his own
inequity or take advantage of his own wrong. The statute of frauds was not intended
to offer an asylum of escape from that fundamental principle of justice."
Ravarino at 574 FN1.
Plaintiff surrendered specific rights under the signed REPC agreement as a favor to
the Defendants. Those rights were abandoned only on the specific promise that the
property would be sold to Plaintiff in 2004. In reliance on that promise, Plaimtiff entered
into the Lease agreement and made significant modifications and renovations to the
property. Plaintiffs abandonment of existing rights and his substantial performance
removes this case from the Statute of Frauds. Plaintiff set forth his position as to
Defendants representations and his reliance thereon in his affidavit filed in opposition to
the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Accepting those representations as true, as
required when they are the representations of the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment, the Plaintiff set forth a valid claim for relief under the doctrine of estoppel and
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his performance defeated the Holmes' defense of the Statute of Frauds.

2.

Integration Clause

Defendants also sought to preclude any parol evidence relating to the parties
intentions in entering into the lease and option agreement on the basis of the integration
clause contained in the lease and option agreement entered into by the parties.
In Nielsen v. Hefferon, 1999 WL 33244735 (Utah App. 11/4/1999) the Court held:
"Moreover, parol evidence is admissible to prove that a party was induced into a contract by
fraud, despite a determination that a writing is an integrated contract."
In addressing this issue the Court has also held " An integration clause may prevent
enforcement of prior or contemporaneous agreements on the same subject, but "does not
prevent proof of fraudulent representations by a party to the contract, or of illegality,
accident, or mistake...Paper and ink possess no magic power to cause statements of fact to
be true when they are actually untrue." Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing,
Ltd, 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1988).
The Court of Appeals defined the types of mistake it was referring to:
First, if the instrument does not embody the intentions of both parties to the
contract, a mutual mistake has occurred, and reformation is appropriate. Second, if
one party is laboring under a mistake about a contract term and that mistake either
has been induced by the other party or is known by and conceded to by the other
party, then the inequitable nature of the other party's conduct will have the same
operable effect as a mistake...
Lloyd's Unlimited at 512.
In the instant case, Plaintiff set forth his understanding of the facts relating to the
execution and effect of the agreements and their provisions in paragraphs 9-13 of his
affidavit. Accepting those facts as true eliminated the defense of the integration clause,
-26-

disputing those facts creates issues of material fact precluding summary judgment

C.

Plaintiff Should Be Allowed to Purchase the Property under the Doctrine of
Substantial Compliance.
Defendants position in this case is that in order for Plaintiff to acquire the property

he needed, according to the agreement, to give notice of his intent to exercise the option
sixty days prior to the exercise date and to be in full compliance with all terms of the lease
at the time the notice was given. Defendants claim that notice was not given until the letter
from Mr. Ziter, which would have been 30 days late, and that the letter was invalid anyway
because Plaintiff was in violation of the lease agreement requiring maintenance of
insurance, filing of a construction bond and payment of property taxes.
Plaintiffs position is that he gave oral representations that he was going to exercise
the option to Mr. Holmes prior to the sixty day deadline, that written notice in the form of
the letter from Andy Truong, Mr. Truong's brother was given prior to the sixty day period
and further that delivery of the notice thirty days prior to the agreed upon closing date
constituted substantial compliance. Defendants' argument results in a "forfeiture".
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed the issue of forfeitures in Commercial
Investment Corp., v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (UT App. 1997) there the Court stated: "We
begin with the well established principles that although parties are free to contractually
provide for an enforceable forfeiture provision forfeitures are not favored in the law. The
undesirability of forfeiture is well-stated by the legal maxim that "the law abhors
forfeiture". Commercial Investment Corp. at 1109 (citations omitted).
In U-Beva Mines v. Toledo Mining Co., 24 Utah 2d 351, 471 P.2d 867 (1970) the
Utah Supreme Court addressed an issue very similar to the one here at bar. U-Beva had
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entered into a lease agreement which contained a provision for the termination of the lease
if there was a breach of any of the lease conditions which were not cured within sixty days
of notice of the breach. U-Beva had failed to make a $95.00 tax payment. Toledo sent UBeva notice of the breach. U-Beva failed to pay the tax until three weeks after the 60 day
notice period had expired and Toledo claimed that under the terms of the lease the lease
was therefore terminated.
The Utah Supreme Court noted that although the payment was three weeks late, it
would be inequitable to allow a forfeiture for a late payment of $95 when Toledo
had already expended $55,000.00 pursuing other lease provisions. Specifically, the
court held:
We are constrained to believe, and so conclude, that in equity Toledo is relieved
from any departure here on the grounds that the defection was so minor as to invoke
the offices of equity, and that at law substantial compliance with the contract, under
the circumstances, would purge an erstwhile default under a generally accepted
policy against forfeiture, and that otherwise, there would be an unconscionability
heretofore condemned by us, justifying the invocation of equitable principles
restricting even the freedom of contracting improvidently. U-Beva at 869.
Cache County v. Bern, 978 P.2d 1043, 1048 (Utah App. 1999).
The Utah Court of Appeals cited with approval to the Arizona case of Foundation
Development Corp. v. Loehmann 's9 Inc. 163 Ariz. 438, 788 P.2d 1189 (1990) where that
court stated:
An overwhelming majority of courts has concluded, without reference to a specific
statutory provision, that a lease may not be forfeited for a trivial or technical breach
even where the parties have specifically agreed that "any breach" gives rise to the
right of termination.
These courts note the sophistication and complexity of most business interaction
and are concerned, therefore, that the possibilities for breach of a modern
commercial lease are virtually limitless. In their view, the parties to the lease did
not intend that every minor or technical failure to adhere to complicated lease
provisions could cause forfeiture. Accordingly nearly all courts hold that, regardless
-28-

of the language of the lease, to justify forfeiture, the breach must be ''material/'
"serious," or substantial."
Cache County at 1049-1050.
In order to determine whether a breach is ' 'material" the Court of Appeals required
reference to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts which states the fact finder should
look at

(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he
reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately
compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived; (c) the extent
to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure
his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable
assurances; (e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to
offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts: Circumstances Significant in Determining
Whether A Failure is Material § 241 (1981).
Cache County at 1050.
If the Court were to ignore the verbal notifications and the written notification of
Andy Truong and accept only the notification sent by Mr. Ziter, a weighing of the factors in
the Restatement clearly holds in favor of Mr. Truong. (a) The reasonable value the Holmes
could expect from the contract was the option price. Irrespective of the delay in notice
they would have received it in full, (b) By terminating the option Mr. Truong receives no
compensation for the $190,000.00+ he spent in renovating the property, he received only
the benefit of the time of the rental which, prior to Mr. Truong's renovations was
$3,500.00 per month against his payment of $90,000.00 in rents and deposits, (c) The
enforcement of the provision as requested by Defendants results in a complete forfeiture,
(d) Mr. Truong, if he was previously in default, completely cured the default through Mr.
Ziter's notice; and (e) There is no evidence that Mr. Truong's actions were in any fashion
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failing to comport with standards of good faith and fair dealing.
The facts as presented provide a clear case for the granting of summary judgment to
Plaintiff on this issue, at a bare minimum they create issues of material fact that should
have been addressed by the jury.
D.

Holmes Failure to Give Proper Notice Dooms Their Claims for Lease
Termination.
In order to forfeit a purchaser's rights under a purchase contract, the seller must

strictly comply with the notice provisions of the contract. Commercial Investment Corp.,
v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Utah App. 1997). Under paragraph 10 of the lease,
before a forfeiture can take place there must be a written notice of the breach to the
breaching party, the notice must identify the breach with specificity, must identify what
must be done to remedy the breach and must give the breaching party five days to remedy
the breach. At the time Mr. Truong gave notice of his intention to exercise the option
there were no outstanding breaches upon which notice had been given. Furthermore, the
cure of any material breaches was only to take place prior to exercise of the option, not the
notice of the option as Defendants have been arguing. Defendants "notices" of default
under the lease were not served until long after the option would have been exercised.
Accordingly they can provide no basis for denying Plaintiff the right to acquire the
property.
III.

DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THEIR REQUESTED DAMAGES

A.

Defendants Were Improperly Awarded A Double Recovery.
"The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of procedure and its

purpose is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single
wrong." Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983). In the lease
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agreement, the parties agreed to the penalty for a hold over beyond the termination of the
lease. In Paragraph 21 of the lease it states:
If LESSEE shall hold over without the consent of the LESSOR, express or implied,
then LESSEE shall be construed to be a tenant at sufferance at double the Rent
herein provided prorated by the day until possession is returned to LESSOR.
R.49.
Pursuant to the Lease agreement, Rent was set at $5,000.00 per month. R.46.
Defendants elected a remedy of double rents for any hold over period as opposed to any
other available remedies.
In their claim for damages Defendants have requested treble damages for the period
of time form November 2005 through May 2006. In their claim for supplemental damages
Defendants attempt to use the unlawful detainer statute as opposed to the contract damages.
Their attempt however is misplaced. In their execution of the contract Defendants
specifically elected their remedy for damages if Plaintiff held over. That election was for
double the regular rent rate. The total due for holdover rents is accordingly 810,000.00 per
month, from the end of the lease, prorated to the time the Plaintiff left the building.
B.

Defendants Are Not Entitled To Treble Damages.
Defendants were granted treble damages under the Utah Unlawful Detainer Statute.

UCA §78-36-10. Subsections (2) and (3) of this section provides:
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the
defendant's default, shall assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of
the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in te
complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the
payment of rent; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38-9
through 78-38-16.
-31-

(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times
the amount of damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through 2(c), and for
reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agreement.
1. Defendants have suffered no damages.
Pursuant to UCA §78-36-10 (2) damages are to be awarded where Defendants have
suffered some damage as a result of an unlawful detainer. The reality here is that
Defendants suffered no damage. In 2003, when Plaintiff took possession of the property,
the County Assessor valued the property at $332,150.00. In 2005, after Plaintiffs
improvements, the market value of the property was $982,660.00.4 The dramatic increase
in the property's value, because of Mr. Truong's improvements, highlights Defendants'
unwillingness to go through with the sale and clearly demonstrates they have suffered no
damages.
2. Rent damages are not subject to trebling.
Under the plain language of the statute "rent" is not to be trebled. UCA §78-3610(3). Rent in this case began with the inception of the lease and terminated at the earlier
of (a) the time of the Judgment being entered, (b) termination of the lease (UCA§ 78-3610 (1)) or Plaintiffs surrender of the premises to Defendants. Since the surrender took
place prior to the Court's order, only rents, not damages, have accrued.
As set forth in the express language of the statute, rent is not an item of damage that
can be trebled. Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206, 214 (Utah 1930). Since the lease agreement
covered a two year period and provided a set amount for rents for any holdover period,

4

A copy of the County tax records showing market value for 2003 and 2005 are attached as
Exhibit "D" to Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Summary judgment on Supplemental Damages.
R. 800.
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there can be no trebling of rents.D

C.

Defendants Are Not Entitled To Their Claimed Interest.
Defendants were awarded interest on unpaid rents from 10/1/04 to 7/31/05 and on

purported hold over rents from that time forward. Defendants are claiming interest under
UCA §15-1-1. This section "does nothing more than define what the rate of mterest should
be in those instances where interest accrues as a matter of law but no specific rate has been
agreed to; it does not create a right to interest where none exists." Vali Convalescent and
Care Institutions v. Division of Health Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah App.
1990). The contract does not provide for any interest. It does however provide for a
specific penalty for a hold over. Such a penalty provision of a necessity contains an
element of interest in its calculation.
Even if there were a legal basis for prejudgment interest on the unpaid rents, "a court
can award prejudgment interest only when the loss is fixed at a particular time and the
amount can be fixed with accuracy." Smith v. Linmar Energy Corporation, 790 P.2d 1222,
1225 (Utah App. 1990). To the extent Defendants are claiming treble damages, said
amounts are only awardable upon ruling of the court. By its nature, a claim for treble
damages is incomplete until the issue has been ruled on.
...where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical
accuracy, such as in the case of personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of
character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the damages must be ascertained
and assessed by the trier of fact at the trial and in such cases prejudgment interest
is not allowed.
Id at 1226 (emphasis in original).

5

The fair market rental value of the property might be used a measure of damages.
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Defendants have been awarded interest on a principle amount greater than that
allowed by law ( see election of remedies argument above). They also received interest on
unlawful detainer damages which are by their very nature unliquidated until entry of the
Court's order awarding them, the award of such interest must therefore be reversed.
D.

Defendants Are Not Entitled To Their Claimed Attorney Fees.
The trial court awarded Defendants $42, 695.01 in attorney fees. There is

insufficient evidence to establish the reasonableness, recoverability or necessity of those
fees.
"Attorney fees are awarded only when authorized by statute or by contract." Paul
DeGroot Bldg. Servs., LLC

v. Gallacher, 112 P.3d 490 (Utah 2005). Accordingly it

behooves the party requesting the fees to provide a break down on what fees are purportedly
being recovered under which method.
In Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325 (Utah 2005) the Utah Supreme Court upheld
the denial of an award for attorney fees to a prevailing party where the party failed to
adequately separate noncompensable and compensable claims. Jensen at 349. The Court
cited with approval Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52,54 (Utah 1998) stating:
Further, the party requesting the attorney fees must categorize the time and fees
expended for (1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement of
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there may be an entitlement to
attorney fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no
entitlement to attorney fees.
Jensen at 349.
In Defendants fees break down they list gross amounts and billing dates, but fail to
-34-

indicate what work was performed to justify such billings. Even a cursory examination of
the facts of this case demonstrate however that the amount of the fees exceed those
recoverable. In the second affidavit of Bruce Holmes he states in paragraph 8 that a notice
to quit or pay rent was served on or after August 9, 2005. Since such a notice is a
prerequisite to any action for unlawful detainer, no attorney fees, unrelated to that notice
would have been awardable under the unlawful detainer statute until after that date.
Defendant is seeking fees also under the lease agreement. However, no claim was made for
a breach of the lease prior to the filing of the Answer and Counterclaim on August 26,
2005. Fees incurred prior to that date were for defending against Plaintiffs claims raised
under the option agreement. The option agreement does not contain an attorney fees
provision.
Even if we were to presume that all of the fees post July were in some fashion
covered by either the Statute or the Lease Agreement, which would not be appropriate as
clearly a significant portion must have gone to defeating the new claims under the option
brought in the amended complaint, that still leaves a minimum of $12,756.00 in fees
purportedly incurred on issues where no fees are recoverable.
In light of Defendants failure to properly set forth the fees actually recoverable
and/or to provide sufficient detail to allow the court to make such a determination all such
fees should be denied.
E.

Plaintiff Is Entitled To Credit For His Security Deposit
It is undisputed that Plaintiff paid to the Defendants a "security deposit" of
-35-

$30,000.00. Defendants however have failed to give Plaintiff credit for this $30,000.00.
Applying the deposit at the outset of the alleged default would provide sufficient rents for a
six month period under the original lease or at a minimum for three months under the hold
over provisions. It would likewise impact the award of any prejudgment interest.
To fail to account for the $30,000.00 deposit is to award the Defendants a double
recovery.
CONCLUSION
In order to defeat a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff needs only to show that could
recover under some set of the plead facts. That de minimus threshhold was easily reached
in this case. The grant of Defendants' motion to Dismiss was accordingly in error.
The Counterclaim relies entirely on the dismissal of the complaint as a condition
precedent to its viability. Since the motion to dismiss was improper, the grant of summary
judgment was likewise improper.
Additionally, as shown above, there are numerous issues of material fact which are
in dispute. It only requires the existence of one such fact to preclude the grant of summary
judgment. Accordingly the summary judgment should be vacated.
Finally, the trial courts award of damages is excessive both as to actual damages and
as to interest and fees. With the reversal of the summary judgment, this issue becomes
somewhat moot. If however the judgment were upheld, The plaintiff respectfully requests
any award be adjusted according to the argument above.
DATED this 18th day of November, 2008
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LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & EIH1NGTON

Shawn D. turner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of October, 2008 a true and correct copy of
Brief of Appellant and an accompanying searchable electronic copy was mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Steven W. Call
Ray Quinney & Nebeker
36 South State Street, Ste. 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
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DEC 0 12008
& NEBBCER
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVE) TRUONGi
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES,
COSTS, AND AMOUNT OF BOND

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 040920717
BRUCE E. HOLMES,
JOAN W. HOLMES and
JOHN DOES 1-5.

Judge: Leslie Lewis

1

,

Defendants.
This matter has come before the Court on the following motions:
1. Defendant Bruce E. Holmes and Joan W. Holmes' (collectively, the "Holmes") Motion
for Summary Judgment on Supplemental Damages;
2. Plaintiff David Traong's ("Mr. Ttoung") Motion to Set Bond & Notice of Filing of
Bond; and
3. Mr. Truong's Motion to Set Supersedeas Bond.
The Court having reviewed the motions and having heard oral arguments, concludes as follows;
This case involves a dispute over a lease agreement with an option to purchase. On
November 15,2006, this Court signed a written order granting partial summary judgment in
favor of the Holmes. The order constituted a final judgment in the case and determined that Mr.
Truong had forfeited all interest in the lease and that he was liable in unlawful detainer for
having failed to vacate the leased premises upon termination of the lease. Il*e Court also
granted a partial money judgment as well as a judgment for reasonable costs and attorneys' fees.
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motions now before the Court are made in connection with post-judgment matters. The Court
will address each motion in tunx
I. Motion for Summary Judgment on Supplemental Damages
On August 31,2006, the Holmesfileda Motion for Summary Judgment on Supplemental
Damages, The Court heard arguments on the motion on November 15, 2006 and granted the
motion in all respects except for the matter of attorney fees and costs, which the Court took under
advisement. The Court now addresses the Holmes' request for attorney fees and costs. The
Holmes? request for attorney fees and costs is based on the lease agreement and on Utah Code
Arm. § 78-27-56.5.
Mr. Troung contends in his opposition memorandum that the Holmes are only entitled to
attorney fees for work performed on the Holmes' claims for breach of lease and unlawful
detainer* Mr. Truong points out that the Holmes' claim for breach of the lease did not occur until
the Holmesfiledtheir Answer and Counterclaim on August 26,2005. Therefore, Mr. Truong
contends that the Holmes cannot recover any attorney fees prior to August 26,2005 and that the
Holmes must separate the compensable and non-compensable claims after that date. The Court
disagrees.
In this case, Mr. Truong1 s original complaint alleged that the Holmes had breached the
option agreement. However, the option agreement was attached as an addendum to the lease and
therefore a part of it As such, the litigation over the option agreement should be covered by the

2
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fee provision in the lease agreement Alternatively, even if the fee provision in the lease does
not directly apply to the option agreement, under Utah law, parties are entitled to attorney fees
when compensable and non-compensable claims overlap. See Dejavue Jhc„ v. US Energy
Corp., 1999 UT App> 355 f 21, 993 P>2d 222 (affirming trial court's fee award because contract
counterclaim and tort claim were based on related legal theories involving common core of
facts).
In this case, the entire litigation has been based on the same nucleus of facts surrounding
the lease and option agreement, Indeed, in the Holmes1 original motion to dismiss, one of the
Holmes* successful arguments was that Mr. Truong could not exercise the option agreement
because he was in default under the lease. The lease and option agreement were attached
together and the dispute in this case has primarily been whether the lease or the option agreement
is the controlling document The Court has concluded that the lease is the controlling document
To the extent that there are claims separablefromthe breach of lease and unlawful detainer
claims, the claims sufficiently overlap to justify awarding attorney fees for the entire litigation.
See Jorgensen's Inc. v. Ogden City mall Ca, 2001 UTApp. 128f 28,26 P.3d 872 (awarding
attorney fees on conspiracy to defraud claim because it significantly overlapped with the breach
of lease claim). Therefore, the Court finds that the lease provision providing for attorney fees
and costs applies to the entire litigation or alternatively, to the extent there are claims separable

3
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from the lease, the claims sufficiently overlap to justify awarding attorney fees and costs on all
the claims.
Mr. Truong also contends that an award of costs should not exceed those costs recognized
by Rule 54(d). However, Utah law is clear that where a contract awards costs, then the award
should include any costs that were incurred in association with the litigation and iire not limited
to costs recognized under Rule 54(d). See Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App.

404 \ 20, 38 P.3d 1001

(holding that in order to avoid making a contractual provision for costs superfluous, contractual
costs should include those costs that axe "associated with the litigation, but would' not be
included under a regular Rule 54(d) cost award.")- Therefore, the Holmes are entitled to all costs
reasonably incurred in the litigation.
The Court must now determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees and costs that
should be awarded to the Holmes. Although Mr. Troung does not heavily dispute the
reasonableness of the fees other than to state the Holmes have not provided sufficient evidence to
support them, a "court's determination of reasonableness is not bound by the prevailing party's
affidavit of expenses." Anryx v. Columbia House Holdings, Inc., 2005 UT App.

118 ^ 3,110

P.3d 176. "Rather, the court may consider a variety of factors, including, 'the difficulty of the
litigation, the efficiency of the attomeys'in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number
of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the

4
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amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved,"' Id. (quoting Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989 (Utah 1988).
This lawsuit was filed on September 30,2004. The Complaint asked for damages in the
amount of at least $280,000 plus specific performance of an option agreement to purchase
property for $463,000. The substantive motions and pleadings that have been filed since then
have included a motion to dismiss the original complaint, a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint, an answer and counterclaim, a motion for partial summary judgment, a motion for
order of attachment in aid of lessor's lien, a motion for order of restitution, and a motion to strike
affidavit. In addition to these documents, various proposed orders and affidavits have also been
filed.

The Courtfindsthat the above motions were reasonable and assisted in the timely

disposition of this case. The Court also finds that Steven Call's ("Mr. Call") hourly rate is within
the range customarily charged in this locality. In addition, Mr. Call is an experienced attorney
and has prosecuted the case well. This is evidenced by the fact that the Holmes have prevailed
on virtually all of their claims and defenses.
Although the subject matter of the lawsuit has not been complex or has involved novel
legal questions, Mr. Truong has added to the expense of the litigation by attempting at various
times to reargue matters that have already been litigated This most recently occurred in Mr.
Troung's opposition to the Holmes' motion for supplementary damages.

5
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Despite the above review, the Court's task in determining reasonable attorney fees is
difficult because Mr. Call's affidavit does not state the time involved witii each part of the
litigation or even with the litigation as a whole. Rule 73(b)(2) requires an affidavit supporting an
award of attorney fees to contain "a reasonably detailed description of the time spent and work
performed.,. /' Although Mr. Call's affidavit provides descriptions regarding the work
performed, the affidavit does not provide any information on the time it took to perform that
work.
However, in the Holmes' reply memorandum, Mr. Call attached invoices showing the
time spent on each matter, The Court has reviewed these invoices in detail and finds that they
are generally reasonable. Notwithstanding this finding, the Court notes that there aire a few items
in the invoices that are not supported and will not be awarded, For example, the Holmes claim
$729.20 for copying expenses, but neither Mr. Call's affidavit nor the invoices indicate what
these copying costs were for or how they were calculated. The Holmes undoubtedly had copying
costs throughout the litigation, but the Court is unwilling to award these full costs vdthout further
support Therefore, the Court is only awarding the Holmes $300>00 in copying costs.
In addition, on Invoice No.334462 and Invoice No. 346230, there are chargesfromL.
Essig amounting to $315.00. It is not known who L. Essig is or how he was involved in the case.
However, because Mr, Call's affidavit states that only he and a paralegal Carrie Hurst worked on
the case, the Court is not going to award the $315.00 in attorney fees attributed to L. Essig.

6
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Finally, it appears that in Invoice Nos, 344909,346230, and 344909, Mr, Call gave a discount to
the Holmes. The total of these discounts is $390.90. However, despite these discounts, the
Holmes are seeking to recover the full amount of the invoices before the discounts. This Court
will not award the Holmes* attorney fees that they ultimately did not pay.

Therefore, the Court

will subtract the discounts in determining the amount of reasonable attorney fees.
Asidefromthose items noted above, the Courtfindsthat the Holmes' requested fees and
costs axe reasonable. Therefore, after makingtiheabove adjustments noted by the Court, the
Court will award the Holmes's requested costs in the amount of $2,174,99* and attorney fees in
the amount of $42,695.01 for a total award of $44,870.00.
II. Motion to Set Bond and Release Attachment
On November 7,2005, the Holmes filed a Motion for Attachment in Aid of Lessor's Lien
Pursuant to U.C.A, § 38-3-4* The Holmes had obtained a lien under § 38-3-1, which provides a
lessor's lien clfor relit due upon all nonexempt property of the lessee brought or kept upon the
leased premises," Section 38-3-3 provides that "[w]henever any rent shall be due and unpaid
under a lease, or the lessee shall be about to remove his propertyfromthe leased premises, the
lessor may have the personal property of the lessee which is upon the leased premises and subject
to such lien attached without other ground for such attachment," Section 3 8-3-4 explains the

1

The Holmes have the total costs as $2,605,00, but the invoices show that costs are
actually $2,604.19. Therefore, the Court's aw^rd of costs is calculated by using the latter
amount
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requirements to obtain the attachment. On February 1,2006, Judge Leslie Lewis granted the
Holmes' motion for attachment,
Mr. Truong thereafter filed the current motion before the Court, the Motion to Set Bond
& Notice of Filing of Bond. Mr. Truong posted a bond for $150,000 and asked the Court to
release the attachment pursuant to § 38-3-7, which allows for the release of attached property
where a bond is posted. Subsequently, the Court entered a ^vvritten post-judgment order declaring
that "aft non-exempt personal property of counter-defendant Truong, which was on the Leased
Premises on February 1,2006 or brought upon the Leased Premises thereafter, is aid remains
impressed with a judicial lien to the fullest extent provided by law to secure obligations owing by
counter-defendant Truong to the Landlords..."
The first dispute among the parties is whether the order of attachment applies to property
on the leased premises that belongs to corporations where Mr. Truong is a shareholder. This
dispute is settled by the plain language of § 3 8-3-3

and the Court's previous rulings. The lien

and subseqtient attachment only applies to the "personal" property ofJbfa* Truong, If there is
property on the premises that belongs to a corporation, it is not the personal property of Mr.
Truong and therefore is not covered by the Court's previous jrulings or by § 38-3-3, The Holmes
cite no authority for attaching property that does not belong to the lessee nor has there been any
claim of fraud or alter-ego by Mr. Truong or by the corporations to which he is a shareholder.
However, if there is any question as to who owns certain property that was or is on ihe premises,
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Mr. Truong will have the burden to show that the property is legally owned by another entity and
not himself.
The second dispute between the parties is the amount of bond that should be set under §
38-3-7. The Holmes contend that the bond should be sufficient to cover all of the Holmes'
damages under the lease. Conversely, Mr. Truong alleges that § 38-3-7 only requires an amount
to cover the amount of unpaid rent. The Court agrees with Mr, Truong. The statutory provisions
for a lessor's lien and attachment repeatedly make clear that the lien and attachment are only for
the amount of unpaid rent In light of this fact, there is no basis for requiring a bond in an
amount higher than the amount of unpaid rent and the Court will set the bond at that amount
In this Court's Order granting summary judgment, die amount of unpaid rent awarded for
the period through October 1,2005 was $60,000. On November 15,2006, this Court awarded
$35,000 in supplemental rent damages for the periodfromNovember 2005 to when Mr. Truong
vacated the premises in May 2006. Therefore, the total amount of unpaid rent is $95,000 and the
bond is set at that amount- Because this amount has already been filed with the Court, the
attachment on Mr. Truong's personal property attached pursuant to § 38-3-7 is hereby ordered
released.2

2

However, this Order only applies to attachments granted under § 38-3-4. There may be
other attachments or potential attachments that are available to the Holmes with regard to the
same property*
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HL Motion to Set Supersedeas Bond
Mr. Truong filed a Motion to Set Supersedeas Bond on June 5,2006 pursuant to Rule
62QX1)- Rule 62(j)(2)(A) states that "the presumptive amount of a bond for compensatory
damages is the amount of the compensatory damages plus costs and attorney fees, as applicable,
plus 3 years of interest at the applicable interest rate," The Courtfindsthat the presumptive
amount is sufficient and will set the bond according to Rule 62QX2)(A). The amoiunt of damages
awarded in the Holmes' partial summary judgment was $111,057.00. $8,329.28 will be added to
this amount for interest through August 1,2006 for a total of $119,3 86.28. The amount of
damages awarded in the Holmes' Motion for Supplemental Damages was $128,073.00,
$4,500.00 will be added for interest through August 1,2006 for a total of $132,573,00.
Combining these two amounts, the total thus far is $251,959.28.
To this amount, the award of attorney fees and costs of $44,870.00 will also be added for
a total of $296,829.28. To this amount, interest for three years at 6.36% will be added pursuant
to Utah Code Ann,

§ 15-1-4(3), which amounts to $56,635.02. Finally, $20,000.00 will be added

to cover reasonable costs and attorney fees on appeal. The amount for the supersedeas bond will
therefore be set at $373,464.30. Because Mr. Truong has already deposited $150,000 with the
Court, Mr. Truong need only post an additional bond of $223,46430, Once Mr. Truong has
posted the additional bond, Mr> Truong will be granted a stay to file an appeal.

10
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Attorney
Fees, Costs, and Amount of Bond, to the following, this 2?l

Steven W. Call
Attorney for Defendant
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385

Shawn D. Turner
Attorney for Plaintiff
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B
South Jordan, Utah 84095
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID TRUONG,
Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant,
v,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON SUPPLEMENTAL DAMAGES

BRUCE E. HOLMES, an individual,
JOAN W. HOLMES, an individual,
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Civil No. 040920717
Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs.
Hon. Sjepbetr L.Henri
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The Court, having considered the Motion for Summary Judgment on Supplemental
Damages filed by Bruce E. Holmes and Joan W. Holmes, counter-ptaintifLs and Landlord
("Landlords"), having considered the memorandum of points and authorities and affii
in support and opposition to the Motion, having also considered the Court's prior P;
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Summary Judgment made in Landlords* favor against David Truong for his unlawful detainer,
and for other cause appearing, the Court makes its determination of undisputed material facts,
conclusions of law and order and judgment as follows.
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

The Court heretofore granted Landlords* earlier Motion for Partial Summary

Judgmeni wherein it determined that counter-defendant Truong ("David Truong*) was liable in
unlawful detainer. Based thereon, the Court awarded damages in the amount of SI 11,057.77
plus attorneys* fees and costs to Landlords.
2.

On August 31,2005, Landlordsfifeda MotionforSummary Judgment on

Supplemental Damages (the "Motion"), The Motion was supported by a memorandum of points
and authorities, the Affidavit of Bruce Holmes and other matters of record. Landlords* Motion
was filed because David Truong failed to vacate the Leased Premises despite the Court's prior
ruling that he was in unlawful detainer.
3.

David Truong filed a memorandum in opposition to Landlords* Motion. In the

memorandum, David Truong does not controvert paragraphs 1,2,3> 4,5,6,7> 8> 9,10 or 16
therein but attempts to dispute paragraphs 11 through 15.
4.

Paragraphs 12 and 14 relate to whether Truong was required to purchase

insurance on the property. At the hearing! the Landlords waived any claim to insurance thereby
eliminating any alleged dispute pertaining to insurance.
5.

In his opposition memorandum David Truong attempts to dispute paragraphs 12

and 13. The paragraphs read as follows:

BK 9473 PG 7920
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[11] Tmong has never paid any of the property taxes on the [Leased PremisesJ which
were owing under the Lease. Consequently, Truong owes property taxes for 2005
together with interest and penalties in the amount of approximately $14,561*
[13-] Truong also owes property taxes for the period of January 1,2006 to May 30,
2006 until he vacated the Leased Premises, The taxes proposed by the Salt Lake County,
if there are no budget changes for 2006, art 510,357,62, Thus, on a prorated basis,
Truong owes taxes in an amount no (ess than S4,315.76 (i.e,t 5/12 x 10*357*62) for the
period of January 1 v 2006 through May 30,2006.
6.

David Truong responds to paragraph 12 by contending that he does not owe

property taxes for 2005 and the first five month of 2006 because his obligation to pay those taxes
arose from the Lease which was terminated. David Truong does not dispute that he did not pay
the taxes but contends he had no legal obligation to pay the taxes despite that he remained in
possession of the Leased Premises. The legal argument, which the Court has rejected, does not
create a disputed question of fact
7.

Landlords* paragraph 15 asserts that Landlords have continued to incur attorneys'

fees and costs in this ongoing litigation including fees and costs pertaining to David Truong's
failure to vacate the Leased Premises, By its Order on Attorneys Fees, Costs, and Amount of
Bond entered November 23,2006, the Court heretofore ruled on the amount and reasonableness
of Landlords' attorneys9 fees and costs thereby eliminating any dispute as to the reasonableness
of those fees and costs.
8.

Because David Truong remained in possession of the Leased Premises after

October 31,2005, Landlords are seeking further judgment against David Traong for holdover
rent of $35,000 for the seven month periodfromNovember 2005 to May 2006 and for treble
damages of $70,000 for that same time period.
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The facts are undisputed that David Truong made only three payments, to

Landlords since the Lease was made. On about October 3,2003, he paid check number 934 in
the amount of $60,000 which paid the first year's rent under the Lease. He also paid at that time
a $30,000 security deposit required by the Lease. The only other payment made by David
Truong was check number 1292 in the amount of $ 1,459 for the partial reimbursement of
insurance.
10.

David Truong has never paid any of the property taxes on the Property which he

agreed to pay under the Lease. Consequently, David Truong owes property taxes for 2005
together with interest and penalties in the amount of 514,561. David Truong also owes property
\a% s for the period of Januaiy 1,2006 to May 30,2006 until he vacaied the Property. The taxes
proposed by the Salt Lake County (if ihere are no budget changes for 2006) are $10,357.62.
Thtr -*n a prorated basis* David Truong owes property taxes for 2006 in an amount of $4,315.76
(i.e., 5/12x10,357.62). If the 2006 taxes are subsequently reduced by the County below the
foregoing pro-rata amount, this Judgment shall be reduced for that decrease accordingly.
11.

Because David Truong did not vacate the Leased Premises and for other reasons,

Landlords have continued to incur attorneys' fees and costs.
12.

On August 31,2005* Landlords filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on

Supplemental Damages ("Motion1*), supporting memorandum, and Third Affidavit of Bruce E.
Holmes.
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The Motion seeks afitrthermoney judgment for supplemental damages including

base rent, property taxes, and treble damages incurred as a result of Tniong's continued unlawful
detainer of the Leased Premises,
14.

David Tniong occupied the Leased PremisesfromOctober 2003 through May 31 >

2006. During that time, David Truong made only three payments to Landlords in (he amount of
$91,459.00 which consisted of $60,000 in rent, $30,000 in a security deposit and $1,459 for the
partial reimbursement of insurance expense associated with the Leased Premises.
15.

David Tniong did not make Lease Payments lor the period of holdover of ftom

November 2005 through May 2006. The total rent due for this period is $35,000 (7 x $5,000).
The treble damages on the foregoing amount is 570,000 (7 x $10,000),
16.

Landlords are seeking a supplemental money judgment against David Tniong for

the additional rent, treble damages and properties taxes owing by David Truong which were not
included the Court's Partial Summary Judgment
CONCLUSIONS OF

LAW

Based upon this Court's Partial Summary Judgment and the (incontroverted facts, the
Court concludes as follows:
17.

The Landlords' Motion for Summary Judgment on Supplemental Damages should

be granted for the grounds set forth in Landlords' moving papers.
1S.

The Court heretofore determined in its Partial Summary Judgment that David

Truong was in unlawful detainer of the Leased Premises and that determination constitutes the
law of this case as to David Truoog's liability in unlawful detainer.
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The issues before this Court relate to supplemental damages suffered by

Landlords as a result of David Truong's continued unlawful detainer of the Leased hemises and
his failure to pay property taxes during the time he was in unlawful detainer of the Leased
Premises.
20.

David Truong has not legally controvert paragraphs 1,2,3> 4,5, 6,7 f 8f 9,10 and

16 of Landlords* support memorandum as required by Ulah R. Civ. P. 7 (c)(3)(B), those facts are
deemed admitted pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56 as a mailer of law.
21.

While David Tniong responds to paragraphs tl,12,13,14, and 15, the response

fails to raise a material question of fact precluding summary judgment for the following reasons.
The alleged dispute as to payments regarding insurance in paragraphs 11 and 14 was eliminated
when Landlonto waived lhat part of their claim at the hearing before the Court. In David
Truong*$ response to paragraph 12 and 13, David Truong also fails to raise a material question of
fact because he does not dispute that he did not make the payments but only that he was not
legally obligated to pay those taxes as a tenant in unlawAil detainer. The Court concludes that
David Truong was obligated to pay those taxes during the time he was in possession of the
Leased Premises pursuant to the original Lease terms and that his unlawful detainer of the
Leased Premises did not relieve him of that obligation.
22.

Concerning paragraph 15, the Court concludes that Landlords have continued to

incur attorneys7 fees and costs in this ongoing litigation which they are entitled to recover
pursuant lo the Lease made between the parties. By its Order on Attorneys Fees. Costs, and
Amount of Bond entered November 28, 2006f the Court heretofore ruled upon the reasonableness
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of those attorneys' fees and costs incurred through the time period covered by that application.
Landlords may seek additional attorneys' fees and costs which they have incurred since ibe
original application for attorneys' fees and costs was made by complying with Utah R. Civ. P.
73. David Truong may respond to any such affidavit pursuant to the provisions of Rule 73.
23,

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78*36-3(l)(a), i4(I) a tenant of real property, for a

tenn less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: (a) when be continues in possession, in
person or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified tenn
or period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether established by
express or implied contract* or whether written or oral, shall be terminated, without notice at the
expiration of the specified term or period."
24.

David Truong became liable in unlawful detainer of the Leased Premises as a

matter of law when he refused to vacate the Leased Premises upon termination of the Lease.
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-35-10T the Court should assess the damages

resulting to the Landlords from David Truong's unlawful detainer. Notwithstanding the Court's
prior ruling that the Lease and Option were the controlling documents, David Tmong failed to
pay any rent for 2005 or to vacate the Leased Premises upon termination of the Lease. Even if
the Lease had not been legally terminated by the Landlords as a result of David Truong's failure
to pay rent, the Lease expired by its own terms on October 1,2005 pursuant to the Lease § I, p.
1. Under § 13 of the Lease, David Truong agreed that Landlords were entitled to immediate
possession of the Leased Premises upon termination of the Lease,

BK 9473 PG 7925

P. 20/39

FEB. 6 . 2 0 0 8

3:46PM

25,

RAY QUIXNEY & NEEEKER 3013281738

NO. 6727

Judgment should also be entered for treble damages in the amount of $70,000

arising after the termination of the Lease based upon the reasonable rental value of (he Leased
Premises. Utah Law provides for the trebling of damages including rent which arose after David
Tniong became liable in unlawful detainer. See Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137,292 P. 206
(1930); Monroe. Inc. v. SidwelL 770 P,2d 1022 (1989), 1025-1026 (Utah App-1989).
26.

The Landlords are also entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' ftes pursuant

Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3) because the Landlords have incurred attorneys* Tecs in enforcing
the Lease made between the parties.
27,

This judgment should be made immediately executable pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78*36-10 which provides that **[ii] the proceeding is for unlawful detainer the payment of
the rent, execution upon (be judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the
judgment, In all cases the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately."
28.

Pursuant to Landlord's motion for partial summary judgment, the Court

heretofore certified its Partial Summaiy Judgment asfinalpursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b),
Because this Summaiy Judgment concludes Landlords' claims for rent, treble damages and
property taxes against David Truong. the Court should certify this judgmentfinalpursuant to
Utah. R- Civ, P. 54(b) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 so that Landlords may pursue collection
of the Judgment for the amounts owing.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
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Based upon the uncontrovertcd material facts and conclusions of law, the Court makes its
order and judgment in favor of Bruce E Holmes and Joan W. Holmes against defendant David
Truong as follows:
1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment on Supplemental Damages filed by

Landlords is hereby granted.
2.

Judgment is made that David Truong is liable to Landlords for his unlawful

detainer of the Leased Premises*
3.

Judgment is hereby made in favor of Landlords against David Truong in the

amount of SI 23,876.76 which consists of $35,000 in rent, $70,000 in treble damages and
$18,876,76 in property taxes.
4.

Judgment is hereby made against David Truong in favor of Landlords in the

amount of 514,179.24 in prejudgment interest,
5.

Judgment is hereby made against David Truong in favor olXandlords for

reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the enforcement of this Judgment. Counsel for
the Holmes may submit to this Court an attorneys* fee affidavit containing the information
required by Utah R Civ. P. 73(b) (2), Any objection to the affidavit shall be filed with the Court
within 10 days after service of the affidavit The Court will make a separate order augmenting
this Judgment by the amount of attorneys' fees and costs determined by the Court to be
reasonable.
6.

This Judgment shall accrue interest at the legal rate provided for by law until paid.
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This Judgment is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered by the

Clerk of the Court without delay pursuant to Rule 54(b) and/or Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(4).
DATED this

/ y day of FeJjwaW, 2007.
BY THE COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF BRUCE E. AND JOAN W. HOLMES was served via first class mail on thed*
day of February, 2007 by depositing the same with the United States Postal Service, postage
prepaid, to the following;
Shawn D. Turner
Larson, Turner, Dalby & Ethington, L.C.
P.O. Box 95921
1218 West South Jordan Parkway Suite B
South Jordan, UT 84095
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID TRUONG,
Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant,

PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
BRUCE E. AND JOAN W. HOLMES

BRUCE E. HOLMES, an individual,
JOAN W. HOLMES, an individual,
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Civil No. 040920717
Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs.
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis

The Court having considered the motion for partial summary judgment filed by counterdefendants Bruce E. Holmes and Joan W. Holmes and having considered the memorandum of
points and authorities and affidavits filed in support and opposition thereto and the Court's prior

rulings in this case and for other cause appearing, the Court makes its findings, conclusions and
order of partial summary judgment as follows:
FINDINGS
The Court makes the following findings based on documentary evidence received by the
Court, the Court's prior rulings in the case, and based facts that have not been lawfully
controverted and are deemed admitted pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56.
1.

Bruce E. Holmes and Joan Holmes (hereinafter the "Landlords") are husband and

wife who own a commercial building located at 1050 State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah (the
"Leased Premises"), which is the subject of this action.
2.

David Truong ("Truong") is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of

3.

On September 25, 2003, the parties entered into a written lease agreement (the

Utah.

"Lease") pertaining to the Leased Premises. A copy of that Lease was presented to and received
by the Court.
4.

In connection with the Lease, the parties made and entered into a written option

agreement (the "Option" or "Option Agreement"), which was attached as sub-exhibit B to the
Lease.
5.

The Option sets forth the terms and conditions which Truong needed to comply

with in order to exercise the Option to purchase the Leased Premises.
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6.

After the Lease and Option were made between the parties, Truong took

possession of the Leased Premises as a tenant. At about that time Truong paid to the Landlords
$60,000 for the first year's rent and a $30,000 security deposit.
7.

When the deadline for electing to make the Option arrived, Truong was in breach

of the Lease by failing to pay the property taxes, failing to obtain a performance bond, and for
making unauthorized changes to the Leased Premises. He was also in breach the Lease for
failure to purchase and maintain insurance on the Leased Premises even though he paid one
reimbursement check to the Landlords.
8.

The deadline under the Option for making the election to purchase the Leased

Premises expired on August 2, 2004 and no election to purchase the Leased Premises was made
by Truong before that date.
9.

On August 19, 2004, the Landlords' counsel sent a letter informing Truong that

he had not made a timely election to exercise the Option which was to be made between July 27,
2004 and August 2, 2004.
10.

On September 1, 2004, Truong's counsel sent a letter to Landlords' counsel in

which Truong purported to make an election to exercise the Option to purchase the Property.
11.

Because Truong's letter was untimely and because Truong was in default under

the Lease, he could not make an election to purchase the Property.
12.

On September 30, 2004, Truong filed a complaint in this action against the

Landlords. The complaint alleged three claims for relief including promissory estoppel, specific
performance and unjust enrichment.
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13.

After the complaint was filed, the Landlords moved to dismiss the complaint.

After the motion to dismiss was briefed by the parties, a hearing was held on April 28, 2005. On
June 29, 2005, this Court made its written Memorandum Decision in which the Court ruled, in
part, as follows:
After considering the parties' respective arguments, the Court reiterates its initial
ruling during the hearing that the terms of the Option Agreement are
unambiguous. The Court also concludes that the plaintiff failed to satisfy these
terms because he did not provide written notice of his election to purchase the
property until one month after the deadline for exercising the option. Further,
even if the plaintiff had sought to timely exercise the option, it appears that he
could fhot do so because he was potentially in default under the Lease. Next, the
statute of frauds precludes the plaintiff from relying on any oral promise to
convey the property which is inconsistent with the Option Agreement. In
addition, there is no doubt that the prior REPC between the parties was never
finalized. Instead, the parties entered into a Lease and Option Agreement, which
clearly supersedes any prior agreements. To the extent that the plaintiff now
claims mistake or fraud in the inducement, no such allegations appear in the
Complaint. Finally, since there is a written agreement governing the terms for
conveying the property, the plaintiffs claim of unjust enrichment related to the
purchase of that property similarly fails.
Memo. Dec, p. 3.
14.

Despite this Court's rulings that the Lease was the controlling document between

the parties, Truong still failed to comply with the Lease including the payment of $60,000 in rent
which became due on October 10, 2004.
15.

On July 22, 2005, the Landlords gave formal written notice to Truong that Truong

had breached the Lease by failing to pay $60,000 in rent and demand was made upon Truong to
pay the rent together with accrued interest in the amount of $4,684.93.
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16.

Despite the notice of default given to Truong under the Lease, Truong still failed

to pay the rent owing to the Landlords. Truong also failed to cure other defaults under the Lease
including but not limited to the payment of property taxes owing to Salt Lake County.
17.

On August 9, 2005, the Landlords gave written notice to Truong to quit or pay

rent in compliance with Utah law. Despite service of the notice to quit or pay rent, Truong still
failed to pay the rent owing to the Landlords. He also failed to vacate the Leased Premises and
failed to cure other defaults including the payment of property taxes owing to Salt Lake County.
18.

The Landlords moved the Court for an order of partial summary judgment against

Troung for some of the amount owing to them.
19.

The facts are undisputed that at least the following amounts were due and owing

by Truong to the Landlords at the time the Landlords' motion partial for summaiy judgment was
filed:
Rent through 10/1/2005
Interest on rent through 10/1/2005
Amount to treble rent from 7/26/05 to 10/1/05
Interest on treble rent from 7/26/05 to 10/1/05
Property taxes for 2004
Interest and penalties on property taxes through 7/26/05
Property taxes prorated for 2003
Interest and penalties on property taxes through 7/26/05
Holdover Rent / damages from 10/01/05 to 10/31/05
Amount to treble damages from 10/01 /05 to 10/31 /05
Total

$60,000.00
6,000.00
21,612.90
390.81
6,283.78
424.11
1,189.30
156.87
5,000.00
10,000.00
$111,057.77

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court makes the following conclusions of law:
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20.

The Landlords' motion for partial summary judgment for amounts owing to them

by defendant Truong through October 31, 2005 should be granted as a matter of law.
21.

There are no material facts which have been duly controverted which would

preclude the entry of a partial summary judgment against Truong. In their opening
memorandum, the Landlords presented 30 paragraphs of facts in support of their motion. Truong
did not dispute paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, or 21.
22.

Truong contended that he disputed paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 22, and 30,

however, the Court concludes that the foregoing alleged disputes fail to preclude an order of
partial summary judgment against him for the following reasons:
First, paragraphs 4 and 5 provide as follows:
[4.]
In connection with the Lease, the parties made and entered into a written option
agreement (the "Option" or "Option Agreement"). The Option Agreement was attached
as sub-exhibit B to the Lease, and a copy of the Option is attached hereto as Exhibit 1-B.
[5.]
The Option sets forth the terms and conditions which Truong needed to comply
with in order to exercise the Option to purchase the Leased Premises.
Truong attempts to dispute the foregoing statements by claiming that they are inconsistent with
the parties' oral agreement. However, Truong's statement is contrary to the plain and
unambiguous terms of the Lease and Option which clearly superseded any alleged prior oral
agreement.
23.

Next, Truong attempts to dispute paragraph 7 which reads as follows:

1

While Huong does not specifically dispute paragraphs 22-30, he disputes any implication that he owes any rent for
the propeity because the property should have been titled in his name based upon the alleged oral agreement ie)ected
by the Court
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[7.]
When the deadline for electing to exercise the Option arrived, Truong was in
breach of the Lease by failing to pay the property taxes, failing to purchase and maintain
insurance, failing to obtain a performance bond, and for making unauthorized changes to
the Leased Premises.
Truong responds by contending that even if the foregoing defaults did in fact exist,
written notice of each of those defaults was necessary to preclude Truong's exercise of the
Option. However, the Option language does not require that such advance notice be given.
Rather, the Option f 3 states that "this option may not be exercised while there exists any
uncured material default under the 'Lease'".
24.

Truong also purports to dispute paragraph 10 which pertains to whether he timely

responded to the Landlord's written letter, dated August 19, 2004. However, the alleged dispute
is not relevant to the Landlords' motion for partial summary judgment.
25.

Truong also purports to dispute paragraph 13, which provides as follows:

[13.] Because Truong was in default under the terms of the Lease and because
no election to purchase the Leased Premises was timely made within the time required by
the Lease, Truong was not entitled to purchase the Leased Premises.
Truong argues that he made a timely election to purchase the Property. However,
Truong's legal argument is contrary to this Court's prior ruling that Truong's letter was not
timely and that Truong could not make the election to purchase the Property because he was in
material default under the Lease for failing to purchase and maintain insurance, failing to pay the
property taxes, failing to obtain an improvement bond and for making unauthorized alterations to
the Property.
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26.

Concerning paragraph 22, Truong argues that he was granted leave to amend his

complaint. However, the Court's ruling granted Truong leave to amend his complaint to see if
he could state a viable claim for unjust enrichment or a similar claim for the reimbursement of
expenses for improving the Property. The Court did not eviscerate its prior rulings with the
respect to the enforceability of the Lease and Option.
27.

Truong has also attempted to dispute Paragraph 30 which states as follows:

[30.] Pursuant to its terms, the Lease expired no later than October 1, 2005.
Despite the expiration of the Lease and this Court's two rulings concerning the Lease,
Truong has refused to vacate the Leased Premises.
Truong disputes that the prior rulings required him to vacate the Leased Premises. The
argument is based upon Truong's argument that the parties had a prior oral agreement despite the
written Lease and Option made between the parties. This Court previously ruled that "the statute
of frauds precludes the plaintiff from relying on any oral promise to convey the property which is
inconsistent with the Option Agreement. In addition, there is no doubt that the prior REPC [real
estate purchase agreement] between the parties was never finalized. Instead, the parties entered
into a Lease and Option Agreement, which clearly supersedes any prior agreements." Memo.
Dec, p.3.
28.

Notwithstanding the Court's prior ruling that the Lease and Option were the

controlling documents, Truong failed to pay any rent for 2005 or to vacate the Leased Premises
upon termination of the Lease. Even had the Lease not been legally terminated by the Landlords
as a result of Truong's failure to pay rent, the Lease expired by its own terms on October 1, 2005
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pursuant to the Lease § 1, p. 1. Under § 13 of the Lease, Truong agreed that the Landlords were
entitled to immediate possession of the Leased Premises upon termination of the Lease.
29.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(l)(a), "(1) a tenant of real property, for a

term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: (a) when he continues in possession, in
person or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified tenn
or period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether established by
express or implied contract, or whether written or oral, shall be terminated, without notice at the
expiration of the specified term or period."
30.

Truong became liable in unlawful detainer of the Leased Premises as a matter of

law when he refused to vacate the Leased Premises upon termination of the Lease Accordingly,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10, the Court should assess the damages resulting to the
Landlords from Defendant's unlawful detainer.
31.

Judgment should also be entered for tremble damages arising after the termination

of the Lease based upon the reasonable rental value of the Leased Premises. Utah Law provides
for the trebling of damages including rent which arose after Mr. Truong became liable in
unlawful detainer. See Forrester v. Cook, 11 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930); Monroe, Inc. v.
Sidwell, 770P.2d 1022(1989), 1025-1026 (Utah App. 1989)
32.

The Landlords are also entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees against

Truong pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3) because the Landlords have inclined attorneys'
fees in enforcing the Lease made between the parties.
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33.

This judgment should be made immediately executable pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-36-10.
34.

The Landlord's motion to have this judgment certified final pursuant to Utah R.

Civ. P. 54(b) should also be granted because there is no just reason for delaying execution of this
Judgment.
ORDER OF JUDGMENT
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, the Court makes its order of partial
summary judgment in favor of Bruce E. Holmes and Joan W. Holmes against defendant David
Truong as follows:
1.

Bruce and Joan Holmes' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby granted.

2.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(1), it is hereby declared that David

Truong has forfeited any and all interest in the Lease.
3.

Judgment is hereby made against David Truong that he is liable in unlawful for

having failed to vacate the Leased Premise upon termination of the Lease.
4.

A partial money judgment is hereby made against David Truong in favor of Bruce

and Joan Holmes in the amount of $111,057.77 for rent, interest and damages as itemized above.
Bruce and Joan Holmes may move the Court by way of motion for an additional judgment for
other damages and amounts owing by David Truong to the Landlords.
5.

Judgment is hereby made against David Truong in favor of Bruce and Joan

Holmes for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in this action through October 31, 2005.
Counsel for the Holmes shall submit to this Court an attorneys' fee affidavit containing the
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information required by Utah R. Civ. P. 73(b)(2). Any objection to the Affidavit by David
Truong shall be filed with the Court within 10 days after service of the Affidavit. The Court will
make a separate order augmenting this Judgment by the amount of reasonable fees determined by
the Court.
6.

This Judgment shall accrue interest at the legal rate of interest provided for by law

until paid.
7.

This Judgment is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered by the

Clerk of the Court without delay pursuant to Rule 54(b) and/or pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7836-10(4).
DATED this

tlT

day of September, 2006.

BY THE COURT.

T^BRLESLIE A. LEWIS

District Court Judge
Shawn D. Turner,
Attorney for David Truong
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF BRUCE E. AND JOAN W. HOLMES was served via first
class mail on the 16th day of June, 2006 by depositing the same with the United States Postal
Service, postage prepaid, to the following:
Shawn D. Turner
Larson, Turner, Dalby & Ethington, L.C.
P.O. Box 95921
1218 West South Jordan Parkway Suite B
South Jordan, UT 84095

882966/swc
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STEVEN W. CALL (5260)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801)532-1500
Telefax: (801) 532-7543
E-Mail
scall@rqn.com
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3*-

Attorneys for Bruce E. Holmes and Joan W. Holmes

leouty Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID TRUONG,
Truong, and Counter-Defendant

BRUCE E. HOLMES, an individual,
JOAN W. HOLMES, an individual,
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants, and Counter-Defendants.

ORDER DISMISSING CASE
AND FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
PERTAINING THERETO

Civil No. 040920717
Hon. Leslie A. Lev/is
(filed electronically)

The Court having considered Bruce and Joan Holmes' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint, dated August 23, 2005. and having considered the memorandum of points

and authorities filed in support and opposition thereto and for cause appearing, the Court makes
its findings, conclusions and order of dismissal as follows:
FINDINGS
1.

On or about September 25, 2004, the parties entered into a written lease

agreement (the "Lease" or "Lease Agreement").1
2.

The Lease pertains to property located at 1050 South State Street in Salt Lake

City which consists of a corner lot on the west side of State Street and a small business building
located thereon (the "Property").
3.

In connection with the Lease, the parties entered into a written option agreement

dated September 26, 2003 (the "Option" or "Option Agreement"). The Option Agreement was
attached as an exhibit to the Lease.
4.

The Option Agreement sets forth the conditions which David Truong (hereinafter

the "hereinafter "Plaintiff or "Truong") needed to perform to exercise the Option. Under the
Option Agreement, the parties expressly agreed the Option could be exercised only upon the
following conditions:
[3.] Exercise. This option may be exercised only not earlier than September 25, 2004,
and not later than October 1, 2004. Optionee must deliver notice to Optionor delivered or
mailed by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to Optionor's address set
forth in Paragraph 11, at least 60 days prior to the date of the exercise of the Option, and
the intended payment to Optionor of the purchase price itemized herein. Notwithstanding
anything else herein, this option may not be exercised while there exists any uncured
material default under the "Lease" which is attached to this Option Agreement as an
exhibit.

1

Truong paid the first year's lent in the amount of $60,000.

2

Option Agreement, f 3 (emphasis added).
5.

The parties also agreed in the Option Agreement that in the event the Option was

not exercised, neither party would have any further rights or claims against the other.
6.

After the Lease and Option Agreement were made, Truong took possession of the

Property as a tenant under the Lease. During the course of the Lease, Truong did not exercise
the Option according to its terms and the Option expired.
7.

After the Option expired, Bruce E and Joan Holmes (hereinafter the "Landlords"),

through their counsel, gave written notice to Truong on August 19, 2004 that the Option had
expired according to its terms.
8.

More than two weeks after the foregoing letter was sent, Truong's counsel wrote a

letter to Landlords' counsel on September 1, 2004 stating that Truong was giving 30 day written
notice of Truong's election to exercise of the Option to purchase the Property. Landlords
responded that the Option had expired pursuant to its terms.
9.

On September 30, 2004, Truong filed his original complaint against the Landlords

alleging three claims for relief, including equitable estoppel, specific performance, and unjust
enrichment. In the complaint, Tmong alleged that the September letter was the operative letter
preserving the election to purchase the Property.
10.

In response, Landlords moved the Court to dismiss the complaint on several

grounds.
11.

A hearing on the Landlords' motion to dismiss was held before the Court on April

28, 2005. After a hearing on landlords' motion, the Court made its Memorandum Decision,
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dated June 29, 2005, which provided, in part, as follows:
After considering the parties' respective arguments, the Court reiterates its initial ruling
during the hearing that the terms of the Option Agreement are unambiguous. The Court
also concludes that the Defendant failed to satisfy these terms because he did not provide
written notice of his election to purchase the property until one month after the deadline
for exercising the option. Further, even if the Defendant had sought to timely exercise
the option, it appears that he could not do so because he was potentially in default under
the Lease. Next, the statute of frauds precludes the Defendant from relying on any oral
promise to convey the property which is inconsistent with the Option Agreement. In
addition, there is no doubt that the prior REPC between the parties was never finalized.
Instead, the parties entered into a Lease and Option Agreement, which clearly supersedes
any prior agreements. To the extent that the Defendant now claims mistake or fraud in
the inducement, no such allegations appear in the Complaint. Finally, since there is a
written agreement governing the terms for conveying the property, the Defendant's claim
of unjust enrichment related to the purchase of that property similarly fails.
Memo. Dec, p. 3.
12.

The Court's further ruled that its "Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order

of the Court, dismissing the plaintiffs claims for specific performance and promissory estoppel
and permitting the plaintiff to amend his unjust enrichment clam or to add a new claim pertaining
to the reimbursement of the renovation expenditures." At no time since the commencement of
this action did Truong file a motion for leave to amend his complaint.
13.

On May 12, 2005, after the briefing and hearing on the Landlords' motion to

dismiss were completed but prior to the Court's written ruling, Truong filed a motion to
supplement the record. The motion sought leave to submit the Affidavit of Andy Truong (the
"Affidavit"), and the documents attached thereto.
14.

The Affidavit provides, in part, that Andy Truong, ('Truong's brother"), received

a letter from Landlords' counsel regarding Truong's default in the payment of insurance. Andy
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Truong contends that he answered the letter on January 17, 2004. Andy Truong attached a photo
copy of two documents to the affidavit.
15.

The first document purports to be a letter dated January 17, 2004 that Truong

asserts his brother, Andy Truong, sent to the Landlords , (the "Truong Letter"),. The Truong
Letter provides as follows:
My name is Andy Truong. I am David's brother and partner. I'm writing this in
response to your letter on 1-9-04 concerning the insurance on the building. David is out
of the country for about six weeks and he just asked me to response your letter. He
indicated that he talked to you before he left the country about the insurance situation that
the building is too old and all the electrical is not up to codes to be insure [sic]. You had
agreed to keep yours [sic] insurance and we would reimbursed [sic] you. Here is the
check for $1,459 for invoiced amount. Concerning your letter on terminate [sic] the
lease, we all know that David is ready to make the purchase with cash from day one but
willing [sic] to postpone for a year to help your taxes and federal lien situations.
Just to let you know, we will pay you the full amount as agreed in September to
complete the transaction. If you refer, we can give you the full amount next month to
finalize on this whole deal but you would first need to satisfy all you [sic] state and
federal tax liens. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me at 359-2479.
Thanks,
[no signature]
Andy Troung
for David Troung
16.

While the Landlords received the referenced check, they have no record of having

received the Truong Letter.
17.

The Truong Letter was sent in response to a January 9, 2004 demand letter sent to

Truong by Landlords' counsel which provided:
As part of the lease agreement signed by you on September 25, 2003, you agreed to
purchase public liability insurance and insurance on the building during the entire term of
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the lease agreement. See Section 30 of the Lease Agreement. In addition, Section 30
requires that you provide the Lessor duplicate originals or certificates of insurance for the
insurance policies. Mr. Holmes sent you a request on November 30, 2003 reminding you
of this obligation. As noted in the November 30, 2003 letter, because of your failure to
comply with the insurance requirements, Mr. Homes was required to purchase the
insurance to protect the building. Please remit payment for the insurance acquired by Mr.
Holmes plus 10% interest. Should you continue to ignore this request, we will terminate
the lease. As noted in the option agreement, the option may not be exercised while
there exists any uncured material default under the Lease. We view your failure to
purchase the insurance as a material default under the lease and hereby provide
notice to you. Please take the necessary steps to correct this default immediately. . . .
IS.

The foregoing Demand Letter was sent to Truong by certified mail, return receipt

requested, and the Truong letter acknowledges its receipt.
19.

The Landlords filed an Objection to and Motion to Strike the Affidavit and Exhibit

Attached Thereto on June 2, 2005.
20^

On June 29th, 2005, the Court granted the Landlords' motion to dismiss on various

grounds. However, the Court permitted Truong to file an amended complaint to see if he could
allege a valid claim for unjust enrichment or a new claim pertaining to the reimbursement of the
renovation expenses.
21.

On August 1, 2005, Truong filed his First Amended Complaint ("Amended

Complaint") with the Court. The amended Complaint alleged claims other those authorized by
the Court.
22.

On September 6, 2005, this Court made and entered its order denying Truong's

motion to supplemental and denying the Landlords' objection thereto as moot based upon the
Court's June 29th written ruling.
23.

On August 23, 2005, the Landlords moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint
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with prejudice on various grounds.
24.

On September 27, 2005, the Landlords filed an answer and counterclaim against

Truong seeking, among other things, to evict him from the Leased Premises.
25.

A hearing was held before the Court on all pending motions on February 1, 2006.
CONCLUSIONS

26.

The Court concludes that the Landlords' motion to dismiss Truong Amended

Complaint should be granted.
27.

Truong's Amended Complaint exceeded the bounds granted by the Court which

limited the scope of Truong's amendment. This Court ruled that its "Memorandum Decision
will stand as the Order of the Court, dismissing the plaintiffs claims for specific performance
and promissory estoppel and permitting the plaintiff to amend his unjust enrichment clam or to
add a new claim pertaining to the reimbursement of the renovation expenditures."
28.

The Amended Complaint filed by Truong was not in compliance with the Court's

order and Truong's unilateral actions in filing an Amended Complaint, which went beyond the
scope of the amendment permitted by the Court, was improper. Truong did not seek or obtain
leave of the Court to file amendments to his complaint which exceeded the boundaries permitted
by the Court.
29.

Truong's effort to supplement the record after the briefing and hearing before the

Court had been completed was improper. Truong did not present anything to the Court
suggesting that the Truongletter qualified as newly discovered evidence or that the Letter could
not have been presented to the Court in the first instance. Accordingly, the Court denied
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Truong's motion to supplement the record.
30.

Despite this Court's ruling and despite Truong's prior position in his original

complaint that the Option was exercised by his September letter, Truong alleges in his Amended
Complaint that the Option may have been exercised by the Truong Letter dated January 17,
2004. However, even had the Court permitted Truong to amend his complaint, the Letter
presented by Truong's brother could not have effectively operated to make an election to
exercise the Option for the following reasons.
31.

Truong was in default under the Lease. The Option, paragraph 2, provides that it

may not be exercised while there exists any uncured material default under the "Lease". See
Lease, 1|3,
32.

Truong was in default under Lease because he failed to purchase and maintain

insurance as required by the Lease. Indeed, after Truong failed to purchase insurance, the
Landlords sent a letter to Truong on November 20, 2003. The letter informed Truong that the
Lease, f 30, required Truong to pay for the insurance. After Truong failed to pay the insurance,
Landlords caused their attorneys to forward the January 9, 2004 Demand Letter to Truong. The
Demand Letter stated that Truong was in default for failing to obtain insurance. The letter also
stated that Truong's default would preclude an exercise of the Option stating, "[a]s noted in the
option agreement, the option may not be exercised while there exists any uncured material
default under the Lease. We view your failure to purchase the insurance as a material default
under the lease and hereby provide notice to you." Notwithstanding the foregoing, Truong still
failed to purchase and maintain insurance on the Property.
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33.

Truong was also in default under the Lease for failing to pay the property taxes on

the Property. The Lease §19 provides that "[property taxes on the Leased Premises shall be the
responsibility of Lessee." The facts are undisputed that Truong did not pay the taxes in 2003 and
2004. In fact, Landlords were compelled to pay delinquent taxes on the Property in the amount
of $12,208.40 as reflected by the Redemption Certificate presented to the Court.
34.

Truong was also in default under the Lease for making unauthorized alternations

to the Property. The facts are undisputed that Truong made changes to the Property that were
unauthorized. Truong's statement at the hearing that Landlords eventually became aware of the
unauthorized changes did not operate to alter the Lease term that no changes could be made
without the Landlords' written consent.
35.

Truong was also in default under the Lease because he never obtained a

performance and completion bond for any of the improvements made to the Property as
mandated by the Lease, 1f 7.
36.

Even had Truong not been in default under the Lease, the Truong Letter was

insufficient under the Utah Statute of Frauds to create a binding obligation for the purchase of
real property under Utah law. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 provides, in relevant part, that no estate
or interest in land may be created unless the act to create that interest is in writing and subscribed
(i.e., signed) by the party purporting to create the interest. The Andy Truong Letter is not signed
by anyone.
37.

Any instrument required by the Utah Statute of Frauds to be signed by a party

may be executed by an agent provided the agent is authorized in writing to sign the document.
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See also Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah 1986). There is no allegation in the
Amended Complaint that Andy Truong was authorized in writing to exercise the Option to
purchase the Property.
38.

Furthermore, even had Andy Truong been given written authority to exercise the

Option, the plain language in the Truong Letter does not purport to legally bind Truong to
purchase the Property. Rather the Letter simply contains self serving statements which seem to
suggest that the parties had orally agreed to amend the Lease on the issue of insurance and
indicating further that "we will pay you the full amount as agreed in September to complete
transaction."
39.,

Even Truong did not believe that the Truong Letter operated to exercise the

Option because he caused his attorneys to send the letter purporting to exercise the Option on
September 1, 2004 as alleged in Truong's original complaint.
40.

In addition, the Letter was not properly mailed to the Landlords. The Option, % 9,

provides that "[a]ny notice under this Agreement shall be delivered or sent by certified or
registered mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, and addressed as follows: To Optionor:
Bruce Holmes, 2476 E. Charros Rd., Sandy, Utah 84092. Id. ^9. The Option, paragraph 3,
similarly provides that "Optionee must deliver notice to Optionor delivered or mailed by
certified or registered mail, return receipt requested to Optionor's address." Id. f 3. There is no
allegation that the Truong Letter was sent by certified or registered mail as required by the
Option.
41.

In addition, in the Letter Andy Truong states that he is Truong's partner, however,
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there is nothing in the Lease or Option which makes any reference to a partnership or which
provides that Andy Truong was a party to the Lease or the Option.
42.

The Court also determines that the Landlords' alleged representations that the

Lease and Option Agreement would not be enforced would themselves have to be in writing in
order to satisfy the statute of frauds.
43.

Furthermore, the suggestion made in the Truong Letter that there was an oral

modification made to the Lease relating to Truong's obligation to obtain insurance is barred by
the parole evidence rule and the written terms of the Lease as a matter of law. The Lease,
paragraph 37, which addresses modifications, provides that "[a]nY modification or amendment of
this agreement shall be in writing and shall be executed by all parties." Id. (emphasis added).
Also, the Lease, paragraph 28, pertaining to parole evidence, provides that the Lease "cannot be
modified or amended in any way except in writing signed by the Lessor and Lessee." Id.
Consequently, any allegation that the Truong Letter should be received for the puipose of
reflecting an oral modification to the Lease is barred as a matter of law.
44.

Truong's Amended Complaint also fails to state a claim for fraudulent

inducement. To state a claim for fraud, Truong must plead, as follows: (1) That a representation
was made; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such a representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other
party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7)
did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
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Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982) (quoting, Pace v. Parrish, 247
P.2d 273, 274-75 (Utah 1952)). If any of the foregoing elements is not satisfied, the claim must
fail. (Id.) Truong's alleged claim of fraudulent inducement fails for numerous reasons.
45.

Truong cannot enter into the Lease, and then claim that he was defrauded because

the Landlords orally represented they would not enforce its terms. Because the parties went to
the time and expense of preparing a written Lease and Option, the terms of these documents
should control as a matter of law.
46.

Truong could not reasonably rely on conflicting oral terms when he entered into

the Lease agreeing that he did not rely upon prior understandings between the parties. Paragraph
14 of the Lease states: "Entire Agreement. This Agreement supersedes all prior agreements
between the parties with regard to the subject matter hereof and there are no other
understandings or agreements between them." Option, 1fl63. Truong does not allege that he was
fraudulently induced to sign the wrong Lease but that he signed the Lease believing that a prior
oral agreement was the controlling agreement between the parties.
47.

The parties also agreed that the Lease represented a final expression of the

parties' agreement as follows: Paragraph 28 of the lease provides. 'This instrument constitutes
the final, fully integrated expression of the agreement between the LESSOR and the LESSEE,
and it cannot be modified or amended in any way except in writing signed by the LESSOR and
" This case does not involve an adhesion contract or a lopped sided consumer tiansaction Rather, this involves a
lease tiansaction between sav\ y business men As such, the Court should not attempt to re-write or enforce alleged
oial terms which are inconsistent with a written agreement signed by the parties
See Chnstcnson v Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co , 666 P 2d 302, 307 (Utah 1983) (noting Mikkelson
"imposed on the buyer a duty of reasonable care to inspect important documents that were part of the transaction
conveying the property")
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LESSEE." Lease, ^[28. After agreeing that there were no other representations or
understandings between them, Truong cannot now assert an alleged oral misrepresentation
inconsistent with his written agreement which would satisfy each of the Mikkelson elements. It
was further agreed that "Any modification or amendment off [sic] this agreement shall be in
writing and shall be executed by all parties." Lease T[ 37.
48.

In addition, Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires that a claim of fraud be pled with

specificity and an allegation which is not alleged with particularity does satisfy the Rule. See
Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UT App 30, 18 P.3d 1137, 1140. Truong's Amended Complaint fails
to comply with Rule 9(b) for several reasons. First, the Amended Complaint, ^fl| 27-28 alleges
that the parties first entered into a real estate purchase agreement. However, this Court has
heretofore ruled that the agreement was never finalized. See Memo. Dec, p. 3. ("In addition,
there is no doubt that the prior REPC between the parties was never finalized.") Second, the
statement referring to Landlords that "they conveyed to Mr. Truong that the boiler plate
provisions contained in the agreement would not be enforced" fails to adequately state the nature
of misrepresentation that was made, who made the misrepresentation, to whom it v/as made or
when the representation was made.
49.

Truong's alleged conduct in inducing Truong to sign the Lease and Option was

also not the proximate cause of Truong's loss. Rather, Truong's failure to purchase the Property
was caused by Truong's failure to comply with the Lease and Option made between the parties.
50.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that a claim for fraud

or deceit may not be predicated upon a person's failure to perform an oral promise which is
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unenforceable under the statute of frauds. See Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570, 578 (Utah
1953), ("Nor, as a general rule, can fraud be predicated upon the failure to perform a promise or
contract which is unenforceable under the statute of frauds, since in such case the promisor has
not, in a legal sense, made a contract, and hence has the right, both in law and in equity, to refuse
to perform.")
51.

Thus, if an original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent

agreement which modifies the original written agreement must also satisfy the requirements of
the statute of frauds to be enforceable." Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732
(Utah 1985).
52.

Accordingly, this Court found that "the statute of frauds precludes the plaintiff

from relying on any oral promises to convey the property which are inconsistent with the Option
Agreement." Memorandum Decision, p.3; See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3.
53.

Concerning unjust enrichment, Utah law provides that a claim in unjust

enrichment does not exist when there is an actual contract covering the subject matter. See, e.g.,
Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978) ("Recovery in quasi contract
is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject matter of the litigation.");
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d at 264, 268 ("Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no
enforceable written or oral contract exists."). At the first hearing before this Court there was
some uncertainty expressed by Troung's counsel whether the Lease and Option addressed the
improvements for which Truong was asserting an unjust enrichment claim. Because of the
uncertainty created by the lack of facts or argument on this point, the Court permitted Truong to
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amend his Complaint to assert an unjust enrichment or related claim for his renovation expenses.
54.

Having reviewed the Landlords' Motion to Dismiss on this point and Truong's

response thereto, the Court is satisfied that the Lease does, in fact, expressly address
improvements on the leased premises by indicating that such improvements became the property
of the Lessor (i.e., the Landlords) "upon installation." Lease at §7.
55.

Section 7 of the Lease also expressly addresses the issue of improvements and

renovations to the Property. In fact, the Lease provides that Landlords agreed to the improvements
identified in sub-exhibit A to the Lease provided Truong obtained a performance and completion
bond. However, no other renovations or improvements could be made without the Lessor's
consent. The parties further agreed that "[a]U improvements made by LESSEE to Ihe Premises
which are so attached to the Premises that they cannot be removed without material injury to the
Premises, shall become the property of LESSOR upon installation." Lease § 7.
56.

Because the Lease addressed the improvements and renovations to be made to the

Premises, Truong may not assert a claim for unjust enrichment as a matter of law.4
57.

Truong did not dispute that the parties' Lease term had expired and that Truong

was not current in his lease payments. In fact, counsel's only argument was that Truong was
entitled to the property because he had timely exercised the Option Agreement. As the Court
indicated above, this argument is invalid and cannot justify Truong remaining on the Landlords'
property after the expiration of the Lease, particularly where he has failed to pay rent for an
4

E\en if the Lease did not addiess improvements and lenovations (which is does), it is not unjust for defendants to
retain leasehold impiovements which have become part of the Pioperty because defendants are not letaining money or
property w hich belongs to another See Berrert \> Ste\ ens, 690 P 2d 553 (Utah 19S4) They agreed that the
permanent improvements would belong to defendants
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extended period of time.
58.

In addition, it is compelling that the parties agreed in the Option Agreement, f 5,

that if Truong "fails to exercise the option, Optionor shall retain the consideration paid for the
option and neither party shall have any further rights or claims against the other by reasons of
this transaction." (Option Agreement f 5.) Surely the parties had the power to agree that no
claims would be asserted against one another if the Option was not exercised. They so agreed
and the Court will not attempt to rewrite or circumvent the written Option Agreement made
between the parties.
59.

Paragraph 34 of the Lease provides that Landlords are entitled to the recovery of

attorneys' fees in enforcing the terms of the Lease and therefore the Court should also award the
Landlords reasonable attorneys' fees and costs which they have incurred in this action.
ORDER OR DISMISSAL
Based upon the foregoing findings, conclusions and this Court's prior rulings in the case
and for cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY:
ORDERED that Bruce E. and Joan W. Holmes Motion to Dismiss the amended
complaint filed by counter-defendant Truong is hereby granted;
ORDERED that the amended complaint filed by counter-defendant Truong is hereby
dismissed with prejudice; and
ORDERED that Judgment is hereby made against David Truong in favor of Bruce and
Joan Holmes for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in this action. Counsel for Bmce and Joan
Holmes shall submit to this Court an attorneys' fee affidavit containing the information required
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by Utah R. Civ. P. 73(b)(2). Any objection to the Affidavit by David Truong shall be filed with
the Court within 10 days after service of the Affidavit. The Court will make a separate order
augmenting this Judgment by the amount of reasonable fees determined by the Court.
ORDERED that this Order is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered by
the clerk of the Court.
DATED this _l_

„

^

day of July, 2006.
BY THEXOURT:
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LESLIE A. LEWIS
District Court Judge
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rSLEJI JlSiRfCT COURT
Third Judicial District
JUL . 5 2005
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID TRUONG,
Plaintiff,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 040920717

t

vs.

BRUCE E. HOLMES, an individual, :
JOAN W. HOLMES, an individual,
JOHN DOES 1-5,
i
Defendants.

:

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on April 28,
2005, in connection with the Holmes defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Complaint.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the

matter under advisement to further consider the parties' written
submissions,

the

case

law

alluded

to

during

the

hearing

and

counsels' oral argument. Being now fully informed, the Court rules
as stated herein.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
At the outset, the Court notes that the plaintiff's Complaint
sets forth three claims for relief:

Promissory Estoppel (based on

the defendants' alleged promises to sell certain property to the
plaintiff, despite "boilerplate language in the Lease and Option
Agreement); Enforcement of Contract/Specific Performance (based on
the notion that the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the terms of
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the Option Agreement are "non material and inconsequential") and
Unjust Enrichment
plaintiff

(based on the capital improvements made by the

"in contemplation

of purchasing

the property

at

the

earliest time permitted under the Option Agreement").
In their Motion to Dismiss, the defendants seek to dismiss
each of the foregoing claims. First, the defendants argue that the
parties'

Lease

and Option Agreement

constitutes

an

integrated

contract that superceded any prior agreements between the parties
(including a prior Real Estate Purchase Contract) . Fmrther, since
the

plaintiff

failed

to

exercise

his

option

to

purchase

the

property in accordance with the unambiguous terms of the Option
Agreement, the defendants seek dismissal of the plaintiff's claim
for specific performance. Next, the defendants seek to dismiss the
plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim on the basis that under the
statute of frauds, he cannot rely on alleged oral promises to
convey the property which differ from the written terms of the
Option Agreement.

Finally, the defendants argue that the plaintiff

has no claim for unjust enrichment because there is an express or
implied contract covering this litigation.
During

oral

argument,

the plaintiff's

counsel

advanced

a

number of theories for avoiding the implications of his client's
failure to timely exercise the Option Agreement.

Counsel argued

that the option terms are ambiguous, that a prior REPC requires the
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defendants to sell the property to the plaintiff irrespective of
the Option Agreement and that payment for the property, as opposed
to the mechanics for exercising the option, was the critical factor
in this case.
After considering the parties1 respective arguments, the Court
reiterates its initial ruling during the hearing that the terms of
the Option Agreement are unambiguous.

The Court also concludes

that the plaintiff failed to satisfy these terms because he did not
provide written notice of his election to purchase the property
until one month after the deadline for exercising the option.
Further, even if the plaintiff had sought to timely exercise the
option,

it

appears

that

he

could

not

do

potentially in default under the Lease.

so

because

he

was

Next, the statute of

frauds precludes the plaintiff from relying on any oral promises to
convey

the

property

Agreement.

which

are

inconsistent

the

Option

In addition, there is no doubt that the prior REPC

between the parties was never finalized.
entered

with

into

the

Lease

and

Option

supercedes any prior agreements.

Instead, the parties

Agreement,

which

clearly

To the extent that the plaintiff

now claims mistake or fraud in the inducement, no such allegations
appear

in

the Complaint.

Finally,

since

there

is a

written

agreement governing the terms for conveying the property, the
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plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment related to the purchase of
that property similarly fails.
While making the foregoing ruling, the Court notes that during
oral argument it became apparent that a significant component of
the plaintiff's

claims

related

to the

large

sums of

expended in renovating the defendants1 property.

money he

The Court has

concluded above that the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim as to
the purchase of the property fails because there is already a
written agreement in place which governs this issue.

However, it

is not clear that the parties' agreements specifically address the
issue of renovations and payment for the same, in the event that
the option is not exercised.
that

the

Option

The defendants suggest in their Reply

Agreement

does

address

this

possibility

by

providing that "the Optionor shall retain the consideration paid
for the option and neither party shall have any further rights or
claims

against

the

other

by

reason

of

this

transaction."

A

preliminary reading of this provision suggests that it pertains to
the

original

amounts

subsequent payments

tendered

by

the

plaintiff

that he may have incurred

property that he now cannot own.

and

not

to

in renovating a

If indeed the parties have no

written agreement addressing the renovation issue, it is plausible
that the plaintiff may have an unjust enrichment claim as to his
renovation expenses. However, since the plaintiff's curirent unjust
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enrichment claim only touches upon this issue, the Court is
inclined to permit him to amend his Complaint in order to provide
additional detail on this aspect of his unjust enrichment claim or
to add any new claim which may provide the basis for reimbursing
the plaintiff for his expenditures.

To be fair, the Court will

permit the defendants to file a renewed Motion to Dismiss with
respect to any new or amended claim.
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court,
dismissing the plaintiff's claims for specific performance and
promissory estoppel and permitting the plaintiff to amend his
unjust enrichment claim or to add a new claim pertaining to the
reimbursement of the renovation expenditures.
Dated this >—T/day of June, 2)

A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

•

^

•••

"

v

- ' \
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ADDENDUM "B"

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
15-1-1. Interest rates - Contracted rate - Legal rate.
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the
loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of
their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in
action shall be 10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty
or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any
contract or obligations made before May 14,1981.
Amended by Chapter 79, 1989 General Session

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
78-36-1 "Forcible entry" defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation
or stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances of terror, enters upon or into any
real property; or,
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force, threats or menacing
conduct the party in actual possession.
1953
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

78-36-10 Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent - Immediate enforcement Treble damages.
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judgment entered in
favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of the premises as provided
in Section 78-36-10.5 . If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure
to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property
is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the
forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the defendant's
default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following:

(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendants tenancy, if waste is alleged in the
complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment
of rent; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 7838-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the
amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2) (a) through (2) (c), and for
reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of the rent,
execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the judgment.
In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately.
1994

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 56. summary judgment
(a)
For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment
upon all or any part thereof.
(b)
For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for
summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c)
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be in accordance with Rule 7, The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law, A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.
(d)
Case not fully adjudicated on motion, If on motion under this rule judgment
is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings
and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted, It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy,
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief Is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just.
Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established,
and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e)
Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits, When
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the

pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable, Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g)
Affidavits made In bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court
shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be
adjudged guilty of contempt.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 12, Defenses and objections.
(a)
when presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the
court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of
the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days
after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A
party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a
counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a
reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless
the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these
periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court,
but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect
the time for responding to the remaining claims:
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones Its disposition until the trial on
the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of
the court's action;
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the moire definite
statement.

(b)
How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one Is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3)
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be
made before pleading If a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection
is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse
party Is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to
such a motion by Rule 56.
(c)
Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d)
Preliminary hearings, The defenses specifically enumerated (1 )-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that
the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial,
(e)
Motion for more definite statement, If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more
definite statement before Interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall
point out the defects complained of and the details desired, If the motion is
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the

pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike, Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a
party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order
stricken from any pleading any Insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g)
Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses
and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the
party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h)
Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to
join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to
a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection
or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in
the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(I) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the
denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver
of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may
be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court
of the reasonable necessity therefore, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a
$300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs
and
charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required
of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k)
Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking
as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion
of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
Kerry L. KNIGHTON, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v
Vickey A. BOWERS, Defendant and Appellee.

Specific performance is available when the contract
mvolves property which is unique or possesses
special value; real estate is assumed to possess that
necessary quality. Thus, specific performance is the
presumed remedy for the breach of an agreement to
transfer real property . However, the availability of
the remedy of specific performance of an agreement
to sell land is not a matter of right, but depends
upon an evaluation of .. equitable considerations.
71 AmJur.2d Specific Performance § 133 (2001)
(footnotes omitted).

No. 20030170-CA.
April 15, 2004.
Third District, Salt Lake
Honorable Timothy R Hanson.

Department;

The

Dennis K. Poole and John L. Adams, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant.
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
DAVIS, Judge:
*1 Kerry L Knighton appeals a trial court
judgment awardmg him damages for Vickey A.
Bowers's breach of the parties' agreement (the
agreement) to transfer certain real property (the
property). We affirm.
First, Knighton argues that the trial court erred by
denying him specific performance of the agreement
because real property, by its nature, is unique and,
therefore, he is entitled to the remedy of specific
performance. We review a trial court's decision to
grant or deny specific performance under an abuse
of discretion standard. See Morris v Sykes, 624
P2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981) "Specific performance
is an equitable remedy, and accordmgly, the trial
court is granted wide discretion m applying and
formulating it." LHIW, Inc v DeLorean, 753 P 2d
961, 963 (Utah 1988)

In essence, Knighton argues that he is entitled to
the remedy of specific performance as a matter of
right, based solely upon the fact that the subject
matter of the agreement was real property Knighton
is correct in asserting that real property is assumed
to be unique for purposes of specific performance
and that specific performance is the presumed
remedy for the breach of an agreement to sell real
property. See id However, the nonbreaching party
is not entitled to specific performance as a matter of
absolute right. See id Rather, the trial court, after
evaluating equitable considerations, see id, is
"granted wide discretion" m determining whether
the nonbreaching party is entitled to that remedy.
DeLorean, 753 P 2d at 963. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Knighton the remedy of specific performance solely
because the subject matter of the agreement was
real property.
Second, Knighton argues that the trial court erred
by ruling that he did not have clean hands in
seeking the equitable remedy of specific
performance. See id (stating that "a party seeking
equity must do so with clean hands") The record
reveals that although the trial court used the phrase
"clean hands" m a portion of its ruling from the
bench, the trial court used the phrase as a reference
to Knighton's delay in bnngmg suit against Bowers,
not as a literal reference to the clean hands doctrine.
See id It is noteworthy that the phrase "clean
hands" was not used in the trial court's written
ruling. The record shows that Knighton brought his
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Not Reported in P.3d
? 0 0 n \ r I "97*60 (Utah \pp ), 7004 UT App 102
(Cite as: 2004 WL 797560 (Utah App.))
suit against Bowers in November 2000, and
Knighton does not challenge the trial court's
determination that Bowers breached the agreement
in December 1996. Knighton's delay of nearly four
years in bringing suit against Bowers was an
appropriate consideration for the trial court in its
determination as to whether Knighton was entitled
to specific performance. See 71 Am.Jur.2d Specific
Performance
§
115
(2001)
("[Specific
performance may ... be refused on the separate and
distinct ground of laches or default by the plaintiff
in bringing an action to enforce the contract; in an
action to specifically enforce a contract, the one
seeking enforcement must act promptly." (footnote
omitted)). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by using this delay as a factor in its
decision to deny Knighton specific performance of
the agreement, even though its reference to "clean
hands" was somewhat wide of the mark.

Page 2

ruling, the trial court stated that Knighton was not
"entitled to an award of lost rents ... which occurred
after the breach was declared in December 1996.'"
The trial court's determination that evidence of
damages during the relevant period was inadequate
is supported by the record, is not "manifestly
unjust," and is within the trial court's "broad
discretion." Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Knighton damages for lost rents.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate
Presiding Judge and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
2004 WL 797560 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 102
END OF DOCUMENT

*2 Third, Knighton argues that the trial court erred
by determining that Bowers did not have clear title
to the property at the time of trial. However,
contrary to this argument, the trial court did not
conclusively make such a determination. In its
written ruling, the trial court stated that Bowers
"may not have clear title to the property." This does
not amount to a conclusive determination that
Bowers did not have clear title to the property at the
time of trial. Nevertheless, even if we were to
assume that this was a conclusive determination and
accept Knighton's assertion that it is clearly
erroneous, he does not provide us with any legal
authority or analysis to support his conclusory
assertion that absent this error, he would have been
entitled to specific performance of the agreement.
Therefore, we decline to address this argument
further. See Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9); State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (stating
that rule 24(a)(9) requires an argument to contain
"reasoned analysis based on [legal] authority").
Finally, Knighton argues that the trial court erred
by denying him damages for lost rents. "In fixing
damages, the trial court is vested with broad
discretion, and the award will not be set aside
unless it is manifestly unjust or indicates that the
trial court neglected pertinent elements, or was
unduly influenced by prejudice or other extraneous
circumstances." Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co.,
682 P.2d 287, 291 (Utah 1984). In its written
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
Vickie M. NIELSEN, Appellant,
v.
Estate of Mary Jane HEFFERON, Appellee.
No. 981711-CA.
Nov. 4, 1999.
Paul M. Halliday, Jr., Paul M. Halliday, and Joseph
W. Roteto, SsAt Lake City, fox appellant.
Lynn S. Davies, Salt Lake City, for appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, BENCH, and BILLINGS,
JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official
Publication)
BILLINGS.
*1 Plaintiff Vickie M. Nielsen appeals the denial of
her motion to amend her complaint and the grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant. We
reverse.
A party may amend a pleading by leave of the
court, "and leave shall be freely given when justice
so requires." Utah R.Civ.P. 15(a). "Leave to amend
a pleading is a matter within the broad discretion of
the trial court and we do not disturb its ruling unless
appellant establishes an abuse of discretion
resulting in prejudice." Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763
P.2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct.App .1988). In reviewing a
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
amend, we consider the timeliness of the motion,
the justification for delay, and the resulting
prejudice to the responding party. See Swift Stop,
Inc. v. Wight, 845 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah
Ct.App. 1992). Although motions raised late during

litigation are disfavored, a motion to amend raised
in response to facts discovered after a prior
pleading "should be allowed if there is a reasonable
explanation for the delay in discovering the facts
and the amendment is not unduly prejudicial to the
opposing party." Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 820.
The trial court made no findings regarding the
denial of plaintiffs motion to amend, and the record
before us does not disclose why the trial court
denied plaintiffs motion. Although plaintiffs
motion came long after this litigation commenced,
pi&inXiffs delay is seasonably explained because
defendant did not produce its purported original
release-which
precipitated
plaintiffs
new
claims-until three years after this litigation
commenced.
Additionally, the record reflects no failure by
plaintiff to conduct discovery that would have
resulted in the timely production of the release. Cf.
Chadwick 763 P.2d at 820 ("An untimely motion to
amend is inappropriate where the only excuse for its
untimeliness is the moving party's failure to conduct
discovery."). Defendant's Answer to plaintiffs
Complaint, as well as the discovery pursued by
defendant, focused on the cause, nature, and extent
of plaintiffs injuries. Plaintiff had no reason to
believe that the defendant would rely on a purported
release.
Finally, whatever prejudice, if any, defendant may
suffer from plaintiff amending her complaint is
self-inflicted in that defendant had the capacity to
produce the release earlier. We therefore hold that
the trial court abused its discretion by denying
plaintiffs motion to amend.
We likewise conclude that the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
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law." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). Because plaintiffs
affidavits and proposed amended pleadings raise
genuine issues of material fact bearing on
fraudulent inducement and alteration of the
release, summary judgment for defendant was
inappropriate.
*2 The trial court concluded that the best evidence
and parol evidence rules prevented consideration of
extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent
and the scope and content of their agreement. We
disagree.
The best evidence rule provides that the original
writing is required to prove the content of such
writing. See Utah R.Evid. 1002; see also Utah Code
Ann. § 78-25-16 (1996) ("There can be no other
evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the
writing itself, except in the following cases....").
The trial court erred by relying on these provisions
in that plaintiff does not dispute the content of the
release produced by defendant. Rather, plaintiff
claims that defendant either fraudulently induced
her into signing the release or fraudulently altered
the release. The best evidence rule has no
application to the admissibility of plaintiffs
evidence supporting these claims.

Moreover, "[p]arol evidence is adjuissible to prove
that a party was induced into a contract by fraud,
despite a determination that a writing is an
integrated contract." Id. at 666. Plaintiffs affidavits
are thus admissible to show fraudulent inducement
and alteration and, along with the proposed
amendment to her complaint, raised genuine issues
of material fact concerning those claims. See id.
Because summary judgment is appropriate only
when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact, defendant was not entitled to summary
judgment.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this decision.
GREENWOOD, A.P.J., and BENCH, J., concur.
Not Reported in P.3d, 1999 WL 33244735 (Utah
App.), 1999 UT App 317
END OF DOCUMENT

In the absence of fraud or other invalidating
circumstance, the parol evidence rule excludes
evidence of contemporaneous agreements that
contradict the terms of an integrated, unambiguous
written contract. See, e.g., Hall v. Process
Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026
(Utah 1995). However, "before considering the
applicability of the parol evidence rule ..., the court
must first determine that the parties intended the
writing to be an integration. To resolve this question
of fact, any relevant evidence is adrnissible" Id.
(emphasis added, citations omitted).
Plaintiffs affidavits and motion to amend her
complaint raise the issue of whether the release
reflected the parties' intended agreement. Thus the
trial court erroneously excluded plaintiffs parol
evidence. See Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d
663, 665-66 (Utah 1985).
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